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This Essay explores American unilateralism and the divergence between American
and European attitudes toward international law. The United States, Professor
Rubenfeld shows, has always displayed unilateralist tendencies. Since 1945, how-
ever, while Europe has grown ever more internationalist, the United States has
spoken out of both sides of its mouth, acting both as a world leader in forging the
new international order and as the world's chief locus of resistance against that
order. To understand this phenomena, Professor Rubenfeld argues, it is crucial to
distinguish between two conceptions of constitutional law. "Democratic constitu-
tionalism" sees constitutional law as the foundational law a particular polity has
given itself through a special act of popular lawmaking. "International constitu-
tionalism" sees constitutional law not as an act of democratic self-government, but
as a check or restraint on democracy, deriving its authority from its expression of
universal rights and principles that transcend national boundaries. The interna-
tional charters and institutions that emerged after the Second World War were built
on the premises of international constitutionalism. This development was broadly
acceptable among elites in Europe, where World War H had come to exemplify the
potential horrors of both nationalism and democracy. As a result, the true chal-
lenge international law's supporters face today is that the existing international gov-
ernance institutions are not only antinationalist, but antidemocratic-and not by
accident, but by structure and design. To this extent, America, with its longstanding
commitment to democratic constitutionalism, does in fact have good reason to resist
international governance today. Drawing on this conclusion, Professor Rubenfeld
suggests principles that could guide U.S. relations to international governance
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regimes, showing the kinds of international law that America could embrace
without compromising its commitment to self-government.
INTRODUCTION
On the third day of the 2003 Iraq war, pictures of captured
American soldiers appeared on Arab and, briefly, U.S. television.'
Immediately, Washington admonished Iraq that such displays violated
the Geneva Convention. 2 If the Convention was not honored, the
President warned, those responsible would "be treated as war
criminals. "3
For a split second-this was long before Abu Ghraib-it was just
possible to think that the White House might be joking.
Hadn't we repeatedly broadcast photographs of prisoners we cap-
tured in Afghanistan and Iraq?4 Weren't we the ones who had
declared Guant~namo Bay a Geneva-free zone? 5 And above all: We
were rebuking Iraq for violating international law? Perhaps the
President would next scold the Iraqis for using military force without
the approval of the United Nations Security Council.
America's can't-live-with-it, can't-kill-it relationship to interna-
tional law would later play out in Iraq in other registers. Before the
war, Washington threatened to make the U.N. "irrelevant."' 6 A year
1 The Controversial Footage, PBS "Wide Angle" report, at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/
wideangle/shows/aljazeera/handbook3.html (2003) (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
2 Pamela Hess, Geneva Convention Prohibits Filming POWs, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Mar. 23, 2003, at http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StorylD=20030323-055213-8026r (last vis-
ited Oct. 25, 2004).
3 Id.
4 See Warren Richey, Iraq Prisoners Pose New Test for Geneva Conventions, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 26, 2003, at 2, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0326/p
02s01-woiq.html.
5 The United States refused to apply the Geneva Conventions' prisoner-of-war protec-
tions to the Afghan combatants held at Guant~namo Bay, which to many made the Bush
administration's invocation of the Conventions in Iraq seem hypocritical. See, e.g.,
AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL,
Mar. 25, 2003, at 1-2, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510452003. In
early 2002, a leaked memorandum by a chief White House legal adviser argued that the
"new kind of war" in which the United States was now engaged made the Geneva Conven-
tions "obsolete." Toby Harnden, Al-Qa'eda Prisoners 'Hide Stones as Weapons,'
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Jan. 28, 2002, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/
News/2002/01/28/wguan28.xml (last visited Oct. 25, 2004). While the administration's posi-
tion that anyone, including a U.S. citizen, could be deemed an "enemy combatant" by the
President, and thereby stripped of all judicially reviewable rights, was plainly unconstitu-
tional and has now been so held, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2663 (2004); Rasul v.
Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711 (2004), the applicability of
the Geneva Conventions to the Afghan combatants is a more complex question, on which I
take no position here.
6 See, e.g., In Bush's Words: On Iraq, U.N. Must Face Up to Its Founding Purpose,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, at A10 [hereinafter In Bush's Words].
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later, the Bush administration would have to beg Kofi Annan for U.N.
help in Iraq and would be searching for other ways to put an "interna-
tional face" on the occupation.
7
Then, in mid-2004, the appalling photographs appeared of Iraqi
prisoners abused and, in at least one case, apparently killed by U.S.
personnel.8 Although the photographs took much of the world by sur-
prise and by storm, similar American treatment of prisoners had been
reported over a year earlier in Afghanistan. 9 Ultimate responsibility
for these acts has not yet been established-and may never be-but it
is hard to believe that there was no connection between the adminis-
tration's position that international law was irrelevant to the war on
terror and the disgrace that unfolded at Abu Ghraib.
This is an Essay on American unilateralism: its roots, its contra-
dictions, its dangers, and its possible justifications. Setting out, I
assumed, as many do, that U.S. unilateralism was something new, a
product of the present administration and perhaps of the increasing
influence within the administration of "hard right," anti-internation-
alist voices since September 11, 2001. The reality proved much more
complicated.
Part I summarizes the history of, and contradictions surrounding,
U.S. unilateralism. American unilateralism is far from new. The
United States has been unilateralist since the country was founded-
although, historically, U.S. unilateralism was often a device for
avoiding war, not making it. Since 1945, however, America has
spoken out of both sides of its mouth on international law, cham-
pioning internationalism in one breath, rejecting it in the next. Identi-
fying unilateralism with an ascendant right wing of American politics
suppresses both the history of unilateralism in this country and the
strange two-facedness of America's approach to internationalism
7 See, e.g., Paul Richter, Bush Urges Resolve on Iraq: After Spain's Promise to With-
draw its Forces, the President Calls on Other Wavering Coalition Countries to Keep Their
Troops in Place, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2004, at Al; Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld, Remarks at National Press Club Luncheon (Sept. 10, 2003), at http://www.dod.
gov/transcripts/2003/tr20030910-secdef0661.html ("[O]ur goal is to get a broad-still
broader international face on it."); Fareed Zakaria, Bowing to the Mighty Ayatollah,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2004, at 38 ("Washington is now asking Kofi Annan to give the United
Nations' blessings to its plan, explain that elections cannot be held precipitously, and get
involved in the entire political process."), available at http://www.fareedzakaria.com/arti-
cles/newsweek/012604.html.
8 See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, Annals of National Security: Torture at Abu Ghraib,
THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42.
9 See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, USA: Pattern of Brutality and Cruelty-War
Crimes at Abu Ghraib (May 7, 2004), at http://news.amnesty.org/ mav/index/ENGAMR51
0772004.
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since the Second World War. It also misunderstands the true chal-
lenge to international law today.
Part II explains how the United States came to play such inconsis-
tent roles on the international stage-both founder of the new inter-
national order and chief force of resistance against it-after the
Second World War. At the same time, it explains why American and
European attitudes on international law often diverge so dramatically
today.
World War II came to represent, for continental Europe, the hor-
rors of nationalism and populism. As a result, in the war's aftermath,
European elites were ready to embrace an antinationalist,
antidemocratic international legal system. The United States was not.
The war had a very different meaning here, which led to a very dif-
ferent understanding of the internationalist project pursued in its
wake. Basically, the United States promoted the new internationalism
as part of an ambition to Americanize as much of the world as it
could, which meant both the export of American institutions,
including constitutional law, and the strengthening of American global
influence.
Whatever its motivations, this ambition created a contradiction at
the heart of our post-war internationalist strategy. Because the point
of the new international law was to Americanize, the United States,
from its own perspective, did not really need international law (being
already American). Accordingly, we would lead the world in creating
a new international legal order to which we ourselves never fully
acceded. The new international institutions would be for the rest of
the world, not really for us, and certainly not superior in authority to
our own legal system. As a result, in the ensuing decades, the United
States frequently found itself championing international law for other
countries, while rejecting or resisting it for itself.
Part III asks how this contradiction ought to be understood
today. I suggest that the fundamental issue, whatever the exigencies
of current affairs may be, concerns the relationship between interna-
tional law and the deeper commitments of American constitution-
alism. I do not refer to the debate over the correct constitutional
compartment to which so-called "customary international law" ought
to be assigned. 10 The question is more thoroughgoing. American
10 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997)
(arguing that customary international law is not federal common law, but matter of state
law); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824
(1998) (objecting to Bradley's and Goldsmith's position); see also, e.g., T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on
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constitutionalism differs in certain fundamental respects from contem-
porary European constitutionalism, and the distinctive features of
American constitutionalism have implications not only for the "jus
cogens" or "customary international law," but for supranational legal
institutions as a whole.
At the core of any conception of constitutionalism, there has to
be an account of the special authority, the higher-law status, claimed
by constitutional rules and principles. One such account understands
constitutionalism as an inaugurating or foundational act of democratic
self-government. On this view, which I will call "democratic constitu-
tionalism," a constitution is, first and foremost, supposed to be the
foundational law a particular polity has given itself through a special
act of popular lawmaking.
A very different account sees constitutionalism not as an act of
democracy, but as a set of checks or restraints on democracy. These
restraints are thought to be entitled to special authority because they
express universal rights and principles, which in theory transcend
national boundaries, applying to all societies alike. From this univer-
salistic perspective, constitutional law is fundamentally
antidemocratic; one of its central purposes is to put limits on demo-
cratic self-government. 1
American constitutional history has always displayed a commit-
ment to democratic constitutionalism. The second, universalistic con-
ception has undoubtedly and often prominently figured in American
constitutionalism as well, but it has never displaced the commitment
to the first. By contrast, European constitutional developments since
the Second World War have been increasingly committed to the
universalistic view, with a corresponding diminution in the importance
attached to democratic constitutionalism. The universalistic picture of
constitutional law strongly favors supranational legal and political
institutions, because the most important legal and political principles,
from this perspective, transcend national boundaries and indeed exist
to check national governments. For this reason, I will refer to the
second conception as "international constitutionalism."
the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 91 (2004) (arguing that cus-
tomary international law is neither federal common law nor state law, but in Congress's
jurisdiction).
11 For a fuller description of these two conceptions of constitutionalism, see infra Part
III. See also, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7, 10-16 (1991)
(distinguishing between democratic and "rights-foundationalist" views of constitution-
alism); cf. Paul W. Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights,
and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-6 (2000) (contrasting American
commitment to constitutional idea and myth of "popular sovereignty" with international
law's emerging commitment to ideas of universal human rights).
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The great new international charters and international institu-
tions that emerged after the Second World War were built, to a large
degree, on the premises of international constitutionalism. For
example, these premises underlie the entire contemporary discourse
of "international human rights," which is predicated on the idea that
there exists an identifiable body of universal law, everywhere binding,
requiring no democratic provenance. In this sense, contemporary
international law is deeply antidemocratic. That is the true challenge
that international law's supporters must meet today.
Part IV addresses several possible replies to this challenge. It
concludes, however, that the institutions and ideologies surrounding
international law, at least in its present form, do in fact pose a signifi-
cant threat to democracy-not by accident, but structurally and by
design. To this extent, America does in fact have a good reason to
resist international governance today.
This analysis will please few readers, if any. Advocates of multi-
lateralism and a strengthened international order will see my argu-
ments as supporting American unilateralists. Perhaps they do, but the
analysis I offer does not support American militarism, and it calls for a
number of other conclusions that those who usually support U.S. uni-
lateralism will not find so gratifying. Part V makes these conclusions
clear, suggesting principles that could guide U.S. relations to interna-
tional governance regimes, showing the kinds of international law that
America could embrace without compromising its commitment to
self-government.
I
U.S. UNILATERALISM: ITS PRESENT, ITS PAST,
ITS CONTRADICTIONS
U.S. unilateralism is often described as something "new," associ-
ated with the presidency of George W. Bush:
In the 24 months of the Bush administration, America's foreign
policy has become confused and incoherent because of a new and
indefensible unilateralism .... Never before has an administration
defied the accumulated wisdom of [world experts] and
rejected ... treaties agreed upon by all of the major nations.
12
There is some truth in this kind of claim, but only some.
Undoubtedly, the United States has in the last several years dis-
played remarkably unilateralist tendencies. Even before March 2003,
the United States had, for example, refused to submit to the
12 Robert F. Drinan, Bush's Unilateralism Aggravates World's Problems, NAT'L
CATHOLIC REP., Jan. 10, 2003, at 16.
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International Criminal Court (ICC);13 refused to join the Kyoto
Protocol on global warming; 14 refused to join important new human
rights and child-protection conventions;15 and abrogated the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. 16 Then we made war on Iraq.
Those who said the war violated international law17 were prob-
ably right. Washington never conceded the point, but its arguments
were pretty thin.18 The legal niceties were, in any case, almost beside
the point. In word and deed, the President gave every indication that
the United States would make its own decision about the war, with or
13 See Letter from John R. Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General (released May 6, 2002) (for-
mally notifying U.N. that United States did not intend to become party to treaty creating
ICC), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm. For that treaty, see Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M.
999, 1002 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
14 For the Kyoto Protocol, see Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Framework Convention on Climate Change, 3rd Sess.,
Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.2, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
15 See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involve-
ment of Children in Armed Conflicts, opened for signature May 25, 2000, G.A. Res. 54/263,
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 97th plen. mtg., Annex, Agenda Item 116(a), at 2, U.N. Doc. A/
Res/54/263 (2000) (not yet in force); U.N. Comm'n H.R., Draft Optional Protocol to the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, 58th Sess., Res. 2002/33, Annex, Art. 4, at 7, E/CN.4/2002/L.11/Add.4 (Apr. 23,
2002).
16 In December 2001, President Bush unilaterally announced U.S. withdrawal from the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. See Editorial, Tearing up the ABM Treaty,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at A38.
17 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479,
1523 (2003) (arguing that Security Council resolutions provided inadequate justification for
U.S. invasion of Iraq).
18 For example, we relied on U.N. Resolution 1441, adopted in November 2002, to take
action in Iraq, see, e.g., Interview by Radio France with U.S. Secretary of State Colin
[Powell (Feb. 18, 2003), at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/03021908.htm, which was
rather a stretch, because that resolution seemed carefully drafted not to authorize war
without a further Security Council resolution. Resolution 1441's reference to "serious con-
sequences" if Iraq failed to comply with disarmament requirements, see S.C. Res. 1441,
U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., para. 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002), was a deliberate departure
from the "all necessary means" language (diplomatic speak for war) used in previous U.N.
resolutions on Iraq. Cf. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/678 (1990), 29 I.L.M. 1565 (authorizing member states "to use all necessary means to
uphold and implement [U.N. resolutions] . . . and to restore international peace and
security in the area"). The Americans (and British) also cited U.N. resolutions enacted in
connection with the first Gulf War. See Letter from U.N. Ambassador John Negroponte to
Ambassador Mamady Traore, President of the Security Council (Mar. 20, 2003), at http://
www.usembassy.it/file2003<uscore>03/alia/A3032109.htm; Attorney General Lord Peter
Goldsmith, Legal Basis for Use of Force Against Iraq (Mar. 17, 2003), at http://www.pmo.
gov.uk/output/Page3287.asp. For the view that these decade-old resolutions could not
authorize war, see Koh, supra note 17, at 1523-25; Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypas-
sing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the
Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INr'L L. 124, 139-41 (1999).
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without U.N. authorization.1 9 Thus, for many, the run-up to war con-
firmed the idea that the current administration had opted for a "new
and indefensible unilateralism. '
20
But U.S. unilateralism, with its characteristic resistance to inter-
national treaties, including those "agreed upon by all the major
nations," is decidedly not "new." The United States has been consist-
ently unilateralist for its entire 200-year history.
The "isolationism" usually attributed to George Washington and
early U.S. foreign policy 2' is a misnomer. The United States in its
early decades was not isolationist. It was unilateralist.
A genuinely isolationist country closes its borders, seeking to
keep out foreign people, foreign goods, and foreign ideas. Ming
China after 1430 was isolationist, burning its ships and forbidding
travel to other countries; 22 so, to some degree, were Maoist China
23
and pre-Meiji Japan.24 By contrast, late eighteenth-century America
was wide open to immigrants and hungry for all the European ideas,
fashions, and commerce it could get its hands on. What Washington
famously urged the country to avoid were "political connexion[s]"
with other countries and, in particular, treaties.2 5 The United States
should, said Washington, honor the international agreements it had
made, but make no more. "So far as we have already formed engage-
ments," he said, "let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here
let us stop."
'26
19 On September 12, 2002, President Bush warned the U.N. that the United States
would act on its own if the Security Council failed to take action enforcing Iraq's duty to
disarm. See, e.g., In Bush's Words, supra note 6 ("Will the United Nations serve the pur-
pose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?"). On October 10, the White House obtained
from Congress a resolution authorizing war in Iraq not contingent on U.N. approval. See
H.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. (Oct. 16, 2002) (enacted). On October 25, the United States
proposed to the Security Council a resolution implicitly authorizing war, but President
Bush again warned that he would not be deterred if the measure was rejected. "If the
United Nations doesn't have the will or the courage to disarm Saddam Hussein," he said,
"the United States will lead a coalition to disarm Saddam Hussein .. " David E. Sanger,
Iraq Makes U.N. Seem 'Foolish,' Bush Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at A15.
20 See Drinan, supra note 12, at 16.
21 See, e.g., 1 BRADFORD PERKINS, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS: THE CREATION OF A REPUBLICAN EMPIRE 1776-1865, at 22-23 (1993);
Harlan Grant Cohen, The American Challenge to International Law: A Tentative Frame-
work for Debate, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 551, 559 (2003).
22 See LOUISE LEVATHES, WHEN CHINA RULED THE SEAS: THE TREASURE FLEET OF
THE DRAGON THRONE, 1405-1433, at 145-75 (1994).
23 See, e.g., CHEN JIAN, THE CHINA CHALLENGE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 7 (1998).
24 See, e.g., MARIUS B. JANSEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 78-79 (2000).
25 See GEORGE WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON'S Farewell Address 155-56 (Victor Hugo
Paltsits ed., 1935) (1796).
26 Id. at 155.
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Washington's reasons were twofold. First, "foreign entangle-
ments" could drag the United States into "bloody contests" in which
the nation had no true interests.27 In other words, unilateralism was a
means of avoiding war. Second, foreign entanglements were inimical
to republican government-i.e., to self-government. "I conjure you to
believe me, fellow-citizens," said Washington in his 1796 farewell
address, "[f]oreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of Repub-
lican Government. '28 Any nation with international attachments, said
Washington, is "in some degree a slave."'2
9
With the Louisiana Purchase and the Monroe Doctrine, the
United States proclaimed proprietary and political interests in the
whole of the Americas. The Monroe Doctrine was, quite obviously,
not isolationist. On the contrary, it foreshadowed all the incursions
into Central and South America that would follow in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, including the 1857 war with Mexico, in which
the United States occupied Mexico City and seized large parts of the
West. But the central purpose of the Monroe Doctrine, and of the
continental expansionism it licensed, remained the same goal that lay
behind Washington's "isolationism": to preserve U.S. supremacy in its
own sphere of action and particularly to preserve U.S. freedom of
action vis-A-vis the European powers.30 That goal remained para-
mount in 1917, when the U.S. Senate refused-alone out of all the
major powers-to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, which would have
brought the United States into the League of Nations.31 Here too, the
chief objection to American internationalism was concern that the
League of Nations could oblige the United States to go to war,
whereas the Constitution confided the declaration-of-war power to
Congress.32 U.S. foreign policy from 1787 to 1945 has been called
"isolationist" and "imperialist," but it was decidedly not internation-
alist or multilateralist. Before 1945, the United States never sub-
mitted itself, in any sustained fashion, to international governance of
any kind.
27 Id. at 153.
28 Id. at 155.
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, SURPRISE, SECURITY, AND THE AMERICAN EXPERI-
ENCE 22-25 (2004) (discussing Washington's farewell address and Monroe Doctrine as
basis for U.S. "isolationism").
31 See AMOS YODER, THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 10-11 (1989).
32 See, e.g., HENRY C. LODGE, THE SENATE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 184 (1925)
(quoting draft Reservation No. 3 to Treaty, under which United States would refuse any
obligations to employ military force "unless in any particular case the Congress, which
under the Constitution has the sole power to declare war or to authorize the employment
of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so
provide").
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Even after 1945, when America entered the United Nations,
American unilateralism continued. Of all the major powers, the
United States alone in the late 1940s and 1950s refused to join any of
the great new human rights conventions.33 As of 1993, the United
States was a party to only six of twenty principal human rights agree-
ments,34 and when we did ratify such conventions, we attached "reser-
vations" depriving them of much of their legal force.35 President
Clinton, considered by some a "multilateralist," refused to sign the
Landmines Convention 36 and advised against U.S. submission to the
International Criminal Court (ICC).37 But well before we refused to
participate in the ICC, we had repeatedly defied or refused to submit
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).38 And before the 2003
33 Carolyn Cox Cohan, International Mavericks: A Comparative Analysis of Selected
Human Rights and Foreign Policy Issues in Iran and the United States, 33 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 197, 202-06 & 206 n.38 (2001).
34 See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 611-12
(3d ed. 1993).
35 These "reservations" state that the treaties require no change in present U.S. law and
leave the United States free to disregard international interpretations to the contrary. In
the view of some, the United States is "pretending to assume international obligations but
in fact is undertaking nothing." Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conven-
tions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 344 (1995).
36 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (entered
into force Mar. 1, 1999).
37 President Clinton signed the treaty on December 31, 2000, but he did not submit it to
the Senate and recommended the same policy to his successor. See Clinton's Words: "The
Right Action," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at A6.
38 See R.P. ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 1-35 (1969)
(describing U.S. refusal to participate in World Court in 1930s and 1940s); HENKIN, supra
note 35, at 344-45 (noting recent U.S. refusals to accede to International Court of Justice's
(ICJ) jurisdiction). In 1999, in a suit by Germany against the United States pursuant to the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820,
596 U.N.T.S. 261 (under which the United States has consented to ICJ jurisdiction), the
ICJ issued interim orders enjoining the execution of Karl LaGrand, then on death row in
America, but American officials ignored the orders, the Supreme Court declined to exer-
cise jurisdiction, and LaGrand was executed. Forward to Symposium: Reflections on the
ICJ's LaGrand Decision, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 423, 424 (2002); see also Cara Drinan, Note,
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Private Enforcement in
American Courts After LaGrand, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1303, 1307-10 (2002) (describing how
American courts have continued to ignore ICJ's final holding in LaGrand case). In the
1980s, the United States announced its intention to ignore decisions of the World Court (as
it was then called) concerning Nicaragua:
[I]n 1986 the United States disregarded its own earlier commitment to accept
the jurisdiction of the World Court, and even announced a refusal to comply
with the Court's judgment on the merits, in which the Court ordered the
United States to pay compensation for having violated international law by
carrying out certain military operations in Nicaragua.
John W. Head, What Has Not Changed Since September lI-The Benefits of Multilater-
alism, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 3 (2002).
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Iraq war, we had used force repeatedly without Security Council
approval, as, for example, when the "multilateralist" Clinton adminis-
tration led the bombing of Kosovo in 1999. 39
Why, then, does U.S. unilateralism seem to many so new and
striking? American unilateralism probably has intensified or acceler-
ated in the last three years. But two other factors are more important.
First, what is genuinely new, as a historical matter, is the
extraordinary success of internationalism in Europe and elsewhere
since 1945, a development that intensified after 1989. Through their
participation in the European Union, many European states today
have surrendered prerogatives and trappings of national sovereignty
long considered inviolable.4 0 This backdrop makes U.S. unilateralism
particularly conspicuous today. If the nations of Europe remained as
resistant as America to international law, to international courts, and
to multilateral military command structures, U.S. "exceptionalism"
would not be newsworthy. It would not, precisely, be exceptional. In
other words, the phenomenon requiring explanation today is not only
American unilateralism, but European internationalism.
Second, and perhaps even more important, the United States has
spoken out of both sides of its mouth on the subject of internation-
alism for the last sixty years. We were the driving engine behind the
United Nations.41 Americans would be among the primary architects
39 For the (standard) view that the Kosovo bombing violated international law, see gen-
erally Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 1 (1999). The 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada probably violated international law. See,
e.g., Burns Weston, The Reagan Administration Versus International Law, 19 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 295, 296 (1987). The same can be said of our attack on Libya in 1985. See, e.g.,
Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in Louis HENKIN ET AL., RIGHT V.
MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 45-46 (1989).
40 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity, and Community
in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 369 (1996) (describing phenomenon of certain
states in Europe "scrambling to surrender chunks of their precious sovereignty to the
European Union, which manages migration for its member governments, as well as credit
policies, trade, competition policy and aspects of foreign relations"). As the European
Court of Justice put it forty years ago, "By creating a Community of unlimited duration,
having its own institutions . . . and, more particularly, real powers..., the Member States
have limited their sovereignty rights . . . and have thus created a body of law which binds
both their nationals and themselves." Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593.
The most visible symbol of the surrender of national sovereignty in the European Union is
of course the retirement of national currencies in favor of the Euro.
41 NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE PRICE OF AMERICA'S EMPIRE 133 (2004) ("The
United Nations is in large measure a creation of the United States."). See generally RUTH
B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED
STATES 1940-1945 (1958) (describing development of U.N. Charter as part of United
States' shift from isolationism to international leadership). The name "United Nations"
was chosen to honor Franklin Roosevelt, who suggested it. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 3 (1950).
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of the initial human rights conventions 42 and the strongest champions
of international institutions to monitor rights violations and to govern
the use of military force.43 Indeed, America would press on Europe
the idea of European union itself-with France, ironically, the pri-
mary locus of resistance.44 At the same time, America would promote
a new constitutionalism throughout Europe and the world, a constitu-
tionalism in which fundamental rights as well as protections of minori-
ties would be laid down as part of the world's basic law, ostensibly
beyond the reach of ordinary political processes.45 More than any
other single country, the United States is responsible for the existing
international legal system, 46 which naturally makes it rather hard for
other states to understand how we can act as if that legal system does
not apply to us.
This inconsistency also intensified after 1989, when rhetoric of the
"end of history," "globalization," and a "new world order" seemed to
be everywhere. During the 1990s, for example, the United States was
42 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (describing history of Universal
Declaration of Human Rights with particular focus on Eleanor Roosevelt's role as chair of
drafting commission); Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
405, 415 (1979) (noting prominence of American constitutionalism in development of
international human rights).
43 See, e.g., JACOB ROBINSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 48 (1946) (describing how United
States pressed for creation of Commission on Human Rights); RUSSELL, supra note 41, at
467-77 (describing U.S. role in creating U.N. Security Council to govern use of extraterri-
torial military force).
44 See GEORGE WALDEN, THE SHOEBLACK AND THE SOVEREIGN: REFLECTIONS ON
ETHICS AND FOREIGN POLICY viii (1988) ("[I]t is often forgotten how much the creation of
the European Economic Community after World War II owes to the persistent prompting
of U.S. diplomacy."). On French opposition in the 1950s and 1960s, see Donato F.
Navarrete and Rosa Maria F. Egea, The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the
European Union: A Historical Perspective, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 41, 45-49 (2001).
45 See, e.g., Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 279 (1999) (declaring that "the
United States ... wrote human rights into law for occupied countries, as for Germany and
Japan"); Andrjez Rapaczynski, Bibliographical Essay: The Influence of U.S. Constitution-
alism Abroad, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 405, 424-39 (Louis Henkin & Albert J.
Rosenthal eds., 1990) (describing U.S. influence on development of Japanese and German
constitutionalism following World War II).
46 In the words of one commentator:
Beginning with the trials at Nuremburg and continuing on with the founding of
the United Nations, the .. . introduction of the "rule of law" into the interna-
tional system is largely a product of American efforts and beliefs .... [Tihe
United States has played a tremendous role in developing the current system
of international law, creating a body of law that is largely a reflection of Amer-
ican interests and philosophies.
Douglas J. Sylvester, Comment, Customary International Law, Forcible Abductions, and
America's Return to the "Savage State," 42 BUFF. L. REV. 555, 612 (1994).
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a principal force behind the international war-crimes tribunals in the
Balkans and the drafting of the ICC treaty-only to walk away from
that treaty when we could not get Americans exempted from its
coverage.
47
At the same time, however, in one major domain, the United
States has been as consistent and devoted a champion of international
law as any other country: economics. Although the United States
occasionally may act unilaterally in matters of trade,48 it was and is the
world's leading proponent of multilateral economic-governance
regimes. 49 The current administration may resist the ICC and the dic-
tates of the U.N. Charter, but it supports North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), 50 which subjects the United States to the juris-
diction of international-trade tribunals, 51 and promotes international
free trade and intellectual-property agreements all over the world.52
A similar tension can be seen in many who otherwise support the
47 Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court: Possibili-
ties and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 57-58 (2001); Jelena Pejic, The United States and the
International Criminal Court: One Loophole Too Many, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267,
272-73, 289-90 (2001).
48 See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law, 31 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1997) (describing use of international trade measures by United States to
fight foreign drug kingpins, Fidel Castro, Iran's mullahs, and Libya's Muammar Quaddafi,
"regardless of opposition from its allies and trading partners").
49 See, e.g., William Ascher, The World Bank and U.S. Control, in THE UNITED STATES
AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS: PATTERNS OF CHANGING INSTRUMENTALITY AND
INFLUENCE 116-17 (Margaret P. Karns & Karen A. Mingst eds., 1990) (crediting United
States and Great Britain with creation of World Bank); Joseph M. Schwartz, Democracy
Against the Free Market: The Enron Crisis and the Politics of Global Deregulation, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1116 (2003) (describing United States' role in creating and promoting
Bretton Woods institutions).
50 See, e.g., Joint Press Statement, George W. Bush & Vicente Fox, Towards a Partner-
ship for Prosperity: The Guanajuato Proposal (Feb. 16, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010220-2.html. [hereinafter Joint Press Statement, Bush &
Fox]
51 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Ch. 20, 32
I.L.M. 296 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994), implemented by North American Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993); see infra
note 138.
52 See Greg Block, Trade and Environment in the Western Hemisphere: Expanding the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation into the Americas, 33 ENVTL.
L. 501, 503 (2003) (describing Bush administration's use of trade-promotion authority to
negotiate regional free trade agreements and its desire to expand free trade in Western
Hemisphere through negotiation of Free Trade Area of the Americas); Proceedings of the
96th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Libraries Held in Seattle, Wash-
ington (statement of Robert L. Oakley), 95 LAW LIaR. J. 609, 627 (2003) (highlighting
international treaties negotiated by Bush administration and supported by entertainment
industry, which "have tended to merge intellectual property policy with international trade
policy. And there is now a clear agenda to export U.S. copyright policies, including a
longer copyright term and the use of technological protection but not including fair use, to
the rest of the world").
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familiar, "right-wing" pro-unilateralist position: Many of these
seeming unilateralists become die-hard multilateralists when the sub-
ject turns to trade and property rights.
53
These complications raise a set of important questions that must
be sorted out in order to understand the phenomenon of U.S. uni-
lateralism. The first task is to explain the divergence between
European and American attitudes toward international law since
1945. How could America's role change from world leader in the new
internationalism to world outlier, even as Europe increasingly
embraced integration and multilateralism? Part II attempts to answer
this question.
II
THE Two MEANINGS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
The truism that power and self-interest underlie all politics
applies as much to American unilateralism and European internation-
alism as it does to the foreign policies of every state. Undoubtedly,
the United States has been unilateralist because it could be, while
most other states today are multilateralist because they must be. For
us, unilateralism maximizes our freedom of action. For Europe, inte-
gration and international law are means of increasing economic effi-
ciency and bringing the hyperpower to heel. What else needs to be
said?
A good deal. Self-interest, explaining everything so well, explains
little with any depth. Yes, the nations of continental Europe have
been willing to surrender elements of their sovereignty regarded as
inviolable only a few historical minutes ago, in exchange for hoped-for
economic and political advantages. The question is why. Yes, there is
no doubt that Americans, especially the current residents of the White
House, often have seen unilateralism as serving the nation's interests.
The question is why.
After all, even in 2003, there was a strong case to be made that
America needed to be multilateral as a matter of its own self-interest.
Unilateralism already had provoked resistance and hostility to U.S.
interests around the world. The fact that many Americans continued
(and continue, even today) almost instinctively to favor unilateralism
is itself a phenomenon requiring explanation. Perceptions of national
and political self-interest are not determined by facts or logic alone.
They are inextricably linked to history, culture, values, and
worldviews.
53 See infra Part III.
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From the beginning, the new international order that emerged
after the Second World War had very different meanings in America
and Europe. The reason was that the war itself meant very different
things in America and Europe. Seeing these differences is essential to
understanding the phenomena of U.S. unilateralism and European
internationalism today.
For Europeans, World War II, with its almost sixty million
deaths,54 carried two fundamental lessons. First, it exemplified the
horrors of nationalism. In Germany especially, the war left a deep
antinationalist scar:
The trauma of the National Socialist fiasco led the Germans from a
peak of boundless self-esteem, induced by a so-called nationalist
"philosophy," into an abyss of universal contempt. Thereafter, eve-
rything that smacked in the slightest of the national ideal was pro-
claimed anathema in German literature and in the press. 55
But the turn against nationalism was by no means limited to
Germany. "[N]ational sovereignty," wrote Lord Lothian in 1939, "is
the root cause of the most crying evils of our time and of the steady
march of humanity back to tragic disaster and barbarism." 56 Europe,
too, derived a "never-again" from the war, but the European lesson
was not only "Never again Auschwitz"; it was also, as Alain
Finkielkraut puts it, "Never again nationalism. '57
Second, and more specifically, the war demonstrated the poten-
tial horrors of democracy. We may prefer to forget it, but Hitler was
elected, and Mussolini rose to power through parliamentary
processes.58 Both claimed to speak for their people, and both were in
fact broadly popular, as were the nationalism, militarism, repression,
and, in Hitler's case, genocide that they pursued. 59 Unpleasant as it is
54 See NIALL FERGUSON, THE CASH NEXUS: MONEY AND POWER IN THE MODERN
WORLD 1700-2000, at 33 (2001) (estimating total deaths in World War II of fifty-seven
million people, including 37.8 million civilians).
55 FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS, CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE: A PROGRAMME FOR EUROPE
92 (Henry Fox trans., 1970).
56 LORD LOTHIAN, FEDERAL UNION, THE ENDING OF ARMAGEDDON 8 (1939).
57 Alain Finkielkraut, In the Name of the Other: Reflections on the Coming Anti-Semi-
tism, 18 AZURE 21, 23 (2004).
58 See, e.g., A. JAMES GREGOR, ITALIAN FASCISM AND DEVELOPMENTAL DICTATOR-
SHIP 180-85 (1979) (describing political victories of Italian Fascist syndicates); WILLIAM L.
SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH: A HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY
15-87 (1960) (describing Hilter's rise to chancellorship through constitutional processes).
59 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 306 (1973) (describing
broad popular support enjoyed by Hitler); see also George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compro-
mise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1557, 1590 (1996) (noting that Mussolini and Hitler were "wildly popular" in, respec-
tively, Italy and Germany). See generally DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S
WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996) (describing
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to acknowledge, Nazism and Fascism were populist movements and in
fact manifestations of popular sovereignty. From the postwar Euro-
pean perspective, the Allies' victory was a victory not only against
nationalism, but against popular sovereignty, against democratic
excess.
The American experience of victory could not have differed more
starkly. For Americans, the Allies' triumph was a victory for nation-
alism-for our nation, our kind of nationalism. It was a victory for
popular sovereignty (our popular sovereignty) and a victory for
democracy (our democracy). Yes, for Americans, the War held a
lesson about the dangers of democracy, but the lesson was that the
nations of continental Europe had proven themselves incapable of
handling it when left to their own devices. If Europe was to develop
democratically, it would need American tutelage and assistance. If
Europe was to overcome its nationalist pathologies, it might need to
become a United States (of Europe). Certain European countries
might even need to have democratic institutions imposed upon them,
although it would be best, of course, if they adopted these institutions
themselves-or at least if they could tell themselves that they had.
These contrasting lessons profoundly shaped, in divergent ways,
the European and American experience of the postwar boom in inter-
national political institutions and international law.
For continental European elites, international law would be seen
as necessary because popular will and public opinion could not be
trusted. "Fascism and Hitlerism have . . . tainted European public
opinion" and "infiltrated our countries," said a French delegate at the
debate on the European Convention of Human Rights, who went on:
Behind the State, whatever its form, were it even democratic, there
ever lurks as a permanent temptation, this reason of State [raison
d'dtat]. . . . Even parliamentary majorities are in fact sometimes
tempted to abuse their power. Even in our democratic countries we
must be on guard against this temptation of succumbing to reasons
of State.6
0
In other words, the fundamental point of international law, and partic-
ularly of international human rights law, was to check national sover-
eignty, emphatically including national popular sovereignty.
This remains the dominant European understanding today. The
United Nations, the European Union, and international law more
generally are expressly understood in Europe as antinationalist; they
role of ordinary German citizens in Holocaust); GREGOR, supra note 58, at 172-90
(describing popular support for Mussolini in Italy).
60 1 COUNCIL OF EUR., COLLECTED EDITION OF THE Travaux Priparatoires 40 (1975)
(remarks of M. Teitgen) (emphasis added).
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are constraints on nationalism and national sovereignty, the cata-
strophic perils of which were made so plain by the Second World
War.61 In the words of Manfred Zuleeg, former judge on the
European Court of Justice, "The purpose of European integration is
to prevent the evils of nationalism. To this end, the founders of the
European Communities established, through a series of treaties ... a
supranational power which now makes up the core of the European
Union. '62 Just as important, and for the same reasons, international
law is also understood, although often more covertly, as a restraint on
democracy, at least in the sense of placing increasing power in the
hands of international experts-bureaucrats, technocrats, diplomats,
and judges-at a considerable remove from popular politics and pop-
ular will.
In America, the postwar internationalism had and has a very dif-
ferent meaning. For Americans, the point of international law could
not ultimately be antidemocratic or even antinationalist because the
Allies' victory in the War had been a victory for democracy
(American democracy) and for the nation (the American nation). But
what, then, was the American meaning of the new internationalism?
What was America doing-what did America think it was doing-
when it promoted internationalism in Europe and throughout the
world?
Two principal motivations lay behind America's leadership in the
postwar internationalism, one high-minded, the other geopolitical,
both implying a distinctively American mixture of hubris and hypoc-
risy. The high-minded aspiration involved America's long-held self-
conceit as a beacon to mankind, a "city on the hill," charged with the
mission of showing the world the way to freedom, peace, and pros-
perity. The Second World War had done nothing to damage that self-
conception. Wasn't America light years ahead of continental Europe
in the ways of democracy? Thus when drafting international human
rights treaties, founding the United Nations and the World Trade
Organization (WTO), imposing constitutions on Germany and Japan,
and pushing Europe toward integration, Americans were able to see
61 ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATION 452 (1964) ("Disenchantment with the nation as the harbinger of
the good life was omnipresent, a disenchantment shared by labor, efficient and newer busi-
ness units, intellectuals and bureaucrats-as well as by most of the political parties that
appealed to these groups."); PAUL SIEGHART, THE LAWFUL RIGHTS OF MANKIND: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CODE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 68 (1985)
(describing international human rights system as "substantial retreat from the previously-
sacred principle of national sovereignty").
62 Manfred Zuleeg, A Community of Law: Legal Cohesion in the European Union, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 623, 623 (1997) (emphasis added).
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themselves as laboring generously, for the sake of people everywhere,
to make the world more American.
In other words, we were bestowing on the world the gift of
American law and the American way. Europe might use a different
phrase-"human rights"-to describe them, but the fundamental
rights guaranteed by international law were nothing other than rights
already enshrined in the United States Constitution. As Louis Henkin
characterized this viewpoint, "the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and later the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, are in their essence American constitutional rights projected
around the world. ' 63 International law would be American law, made
applicable to other nations.
The second motivation was to increase American wealth and
power. The great military fact confronting the Allies in the aftermath
of the war was the presence of massive American and Soviet armies
still occupying Europe. Initial histories of the period painted
Roosevelt as clumsily trustful of a continuing American-Soviet alli-
ance. In retrospect, as Wallerstein has argued, it seems plausible that
as early as Yalta, Roosevelt and Stalin already foresaw and brokered a
kind of division of the world into two spheres of influence. 64 Whether
brokered or not, this global division would be the world's postwar
reality. In essence, Eastern Europe and the Balkans would go to the
Soviets, while Western Europe and Japan would be under American
"protection," with the rest of the world an undecided battleground.
Behind the "Iron Curtain," Soviet military power and a Soviet-domi-
nated command economy would rule, while the "free world" would
have a U.S.-dominated market economy and U.S. military power
behind it. Hence America's internationalist crusade after 1945 was in
part intended to establish, throughout as much of the world as pos-
sible, a stable legal, political and economic order in which American
commerce would flow freely and American military power would
reign supreme.
Both these sets of motives could be described as "imperialist."
Both shared a common objective: to Americanize the world through
a new international order. Naturally, therefore, America would be
the great champion of the new international order. Why wouldn't
America support the project of making the world more American?
But for just this reason, in the American worldview, all this inter-
nationalism, all this multilateralism, was more for the rest of the world
63 Henkin, supra note 42, at 415.
64 IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POWER: THE UNITED
STATES IN A CHAOTIC WORLD 15 (2003).
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than it was for us. This is the root-source of all subsequent American
equivocation on international law. From the beginning, Americans
imagined international law applying to the world, but not applying-
or not applying in exactly the same way-to America.
It would be inaccurate to call America's position hypocritical, in
the sense of paying pious lip service to a rule while secretly violating
it. After all, it was not as if America would tell the rest of the world to
abolish capital punishment while covertly continuing to put murderers
to death. Rather, the American idea was that we already had the law
that the international legal system would introduce elsewhere. Inter-
national human rights were American rights. The notion that prac-
tices constitutional under our Bill of Rights might violate
"international human rights" was not, from this point of view, a con-
ceptual possibility. The point of the new internationalism was to
Americanize. But we, needless to say, were already American.
Hence our willingness to promote international law would be
second to none-except when it came to any covenants or conven-
tions that might require a change in our own laws. The idea that inter-
national law could be a means of changing internal or domestic U.S.
law was emphatically resisted by the principal organs of U.S. foreign
policy. The State Department took this view in a circular published
shortly after the war.65 The rest of the world needed American law
and American-modeled constitutions, but we didn't. The rest of the
world might not be able to trust its own democratic self-government,
but we could. We were not the ones repeatedly engulfing the world in
war. We were not the ones putting Hitlers and Mussolinis into power.
All we needed, all we would be accountable to, was the law we had
given ourselves.
In other words, while the U.S. Senate's refusal to ratify the early
human rights conventions may well have reflected Southern racism,
66
65 According to the circular,
Treaties should be designed to promote United States interests by securing
action by foreign governments in a way deemed advantageous to the United
States. Treaties are not to be used as a device for the purpose of effecting
internal social changes or to try to circumvent the constitutional procedures
established in relation to what are essentially matters of domestic concern.
U.S. State Dep't Circular No. 175 (Dec. 13, 1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 785
(1956) (emphasis added).
66 See, e.g., David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Founda-
tions of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1273-74
(2000) (describing race-based motivation for Senator Bricker's seven-year attempt to pass
constitutional amendment preventing United States from entering into binding interna-
tional human-rights covenant); see generally DUANE TANANBAUM: THE BRICKER AMEND-
MENT CONTROVERSY, A TEST OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988)
(describing history of Bricker Amendment).
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it also reflected something else. Americans could not embrace the
new internationalism the same way the continental European states
were prepared to embrace it. The American experience of World War
I1 did not warrant it. Americans were not yet ready to break with, or
let go of, their history of independent self-government.
The Cold War prevented Europe and the "international commu-
nity" from protesting U.S. unilateralism too much. Europe was too
weak; American military might was too necessary. Things changed,
however, after 1989. As European integration progressed and as the
Soviet fall from world power turned into utter collapse, the "interna-
tional community" became more discontent with American power.
67
It came to see international law as a vehicle for restraining the
"hyperpower," and it became increasingly less tolerant of American
"exceptionalism."
Fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, three years after
September 11, and one year after the occupation of Iraq, America can
no longer delude itself into imagining that the rest of the world will
embrace the idea of being Americanized through the international
legal and political order. International law is not American law under
another name. Internationalism is not a vehicle for American power,
but a counter-weight to U.S. power. It is no longer Europe that would
drag an unwilling America into war through the invocation of interna-
tional treaty obligations, but America that makes war in the face of
Europe's invocation of international treaty obligations.
With the old illusions intact, it was possible to think of U.S. uni-
lateralism as somehow consistent with internationalism: We would
remain quintessentially American, while the rest of the world became
more like us. American unilateralism, combined with multilateralism
everywhere else, would eventually bring about worldwide conver-
gence on a set of common (American) principles. Shorn of these illu-
sions, America today has to face the reality that U.S. unilateralism
directly and sometimes profoundly conflicts with the aims and values
of the "international community." Yesterday, it was hubristic, but not
hypocritical, when America urged other nations to join international
human rights conventions the United States itself refused to ratify.
After Abu Ghraib, the thought of our administration scolding another
67 See, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr.
1999, at 35, 38-43 (noting growing international impatience with and resentment of Amer-
ican power since 1989). See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER:
AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003) (describing growing disagree-
ment between Europe and United States concerning use of military power and America's
role in world affairs).
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state for violating the Geneva Convention takes on a rather different
hue.
What, then, are we Americans to think of U.S. unilateralism
today? Should people of conscience condemn it? Or is there some-
thing to be said in its favor?
I will argue in the next section that there is. Despite the war in
Iraq and the glaring failures of the occupation that followed, the
United States does have good reason to continue resisting interna-
tional governance regimes. International law, at least in its present
form, stands in considerable tension with the fundamental commit-
ments of American constitutionalism.
III
UNILATERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
International law enjoys a kind of higher-law status throughout
much of Europe and in other parts of the world today. It is, for many,
a form of constitutional law-a body of supreme law authorized to
override all other laws and governmental decisions. But international
law embodies a distinct conception of constitutionalism, different in
important respects from what has historically been the American con-
ception. The differences between these two competing conceptions of
constitutionalism are not nearly as well known as they ought to be, but
they are central to the divergent American and European attitudes
toward international law today.
There always have been two quite different conceptions of consti-
tutionalism and its relationship to democracy. For convenience, I am
going to call one of these two conceptions of constitutionalism more
characteristically American and the other more characteristically
European, but I want to stress at the outset that these are shorthand
associations. Both conceptions have advocates on both sides of the
Atlantic. Moreover, there are multiple, distinct, competing strands of
constitutionalism within Europe, just as there are many perspectives
on constitutionalism in America. Nevertheless, the transatlantic
divide on this point is real, and, although the existence of these two
conceptions of constitutional law has been insufficiently recognized,
the differences between them are essential to understanding U.S. uni-
lateralism and European internationalism today.
A. Two Kinds of Constitutionalism
Here is one way constitutionalism can be understood: Constitu-
tional rights are universal. They are rights people have by nature, by
virtue of being persons, by reason of morality, or by reason of Reason
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itself. Constitutional principles-essentially the liberal principles of
the Enlightenment-possess an authority superior to that of politics,
including, of course, democratic politics. This special authority,
residing in a normative domain higher than that of politics, is what
allows constitutional law properly to displace the outcomes of political
decisionmaking, including democratic decisionmaking.
68
On this view, constitutional principles and structures ought in
principle to be supra-national. Constitutional rights transcend
national boundaries. Constitutional principles are superior to claims
of national sovereignty or self-determination. Constitutional law
stands above nation-states, and hence it is only natural that interna-
tional actors should frame the world's constitutions, interpret these
constitutions, and enforce them.
These are abstract propositions. To make this attitude toward
constitutionalism more concrete, let me tell a story exemplifying it.
For several years, I have served as a United States Observer at the
Council of Europe, an organization of European states formed in 1949
and a precursor of the European Union. One of my first duties there
was to participate on a committee attempting to draft a constitutional
charter for Kosovo. The committee consisted of distinguished jurists
and constitutionalists from all over the world. We met in Paris and in
a palatial setting in Venice, where Tintorettos and Carpaccios hung
from the walls. The proceedings were expert in every respect. I
noticed, however, that the committee had no Kosovar members.
I was not certain whether this absence was deliberate, so I made
inquiries. It was deliberate. Committee members explained to me
that involving Kosovars in the drafting of a constitution for Kosovo
was quite unnecessary and would have mired the process in factional
politics. But shouldn't Kosovo's Constitution be responsive to Kosovo
society? Yes, I was told, but there was no need to worry. The com-
mittee had made a three-day fact-finding mission to Pristina, ensuring
that local conditions would be taken into account.
Might it at least have been desirable, I asked, to draft a transi-
tional document, on the model of the interim South African Constitu-
tion, creating institutions through which Kosovars could later write
and ratify their own charter? No, was the committee's answer. It was
a constitution we were drafting, and constitutions are meant to be per-
manent. They have to conform to international principles and norms.
68 Of course, the fundamental rights derived from universal liberal principles will differ,
according to the predilections of the theorist deriving them. See generally RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY(1986) (emphasizing rights of equal concern and
respect); RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985) (emphasizing rights of private property).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
(Vol. 79:1971
HeinOnline -- 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1992 2004
December 2004] UNILATERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
It would not do to encourage revision or redrafting once the new con-
stitution had been installed.
I am not trying to diminish the job the committee performed.
The text they drew up was exemplary, though never enacted. The
point is simply to illustrate the competition between two very dif-
ferent understandings of constitutional law.
The committee's work exemplified international constitution-
alism. On this view, it is not particularly important that a constitution
be the product of a national participatory political process, through
which people commit to writing the fundamental values or principles
that will govern their society. What matters is that the constitution
recognize human rights, protect minorities, establish the rule of law,
and set up stable democratic political institutions, preferably of a par-
liamentarist variety in which the chief executive is not directly elected
by the people. (The committee eventually followed the latter prin-
ciple right down to the organization of municipal governance in
Kosovo. The mayors of each town were to be chosen by an elected
city council, not by popular vote. When I asked why, the committee
members replied, puzzled by the fact that I did not already know the
answer, that this would make the mayor's office "more democratic.")
In this constitutionalism, a democratic ratification process, if pur-
sued at all, is pursued primarily for reasons of expedience. Ratifica-
tion of a new constitution may be instrumentally valuable-a means
of procuring acquiescence-but, in principle, having a committee of
expert jurists draw up a constitution is equally satisfactory. Having
that constitution imposed by an occupying power can be awkward, but
in principle it too would be acceptable, so long as the occupying power
was recognized as valid under international law.
The alternative conception is democratic constitutionalism. On
this view, a constitution is not to be conceptualized as something prior
to or outside of democratic politics. On the contrary, a nation's con-
stitution ought to be made through national democratic processes,
because the business of the constitution is to allow people to make
their own fundamental law-to decide for themselves on the enduring
legal and political commitments that will govern the polity in the
future. These commitments will include fundamental rights that stand
against majority rule at any given moment, but these counter-
majoritarian rights are not therefore counter-democratic. The reason
they are not counter-democratic is not that they guarantee the neces-
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sary conditions or processes of democratic rule.69 Nor is it that they
capture the "true" historic "soul" or "character" of the nation.70 The
reason these constitutional rights are democratic is that they represent
the nation's self-given law, enacted through a special, democratic, con-
stitutional politics, subject to democratic amendment processes in the
future. Over time, on this view, constitutional law is supposed to
evolve in a fashion that continues to express national interpretations
and reinterpretations of these fundamental national commitments.
From this perspective, a democratic process of constitution-
making, particularly when it comes to ratification, is crucial. But the
work of drafting and ratification is only the beginning. Just as impor-
tant, if not more so, is the work of constitutional interpretation,
because constitutional law must somehow remain the nation's self-
given law even as it is reworked through judicial interpretation and
reinterpretation. In international constitutionalism, interpretation of
the constitution by a body of international jurists is in principle not
only satisfactory; it is superior to local interpretation, which invariably
involves constitutional law in internal, partisan, and ideological polit-
ical disputes. By contrast, in democratic constitutionalism, a process
of national interpretation is as crucial as is the process of national con-
stitution-making.
Let's be frank: Americans have at times been the most aggres-
sive proponents of international constitutionalism, seeking to dissemi-
nate or impose (American) constitutional principles around the world,
without much concern about whether these principles reflect other
nations' self-given commitments. But when Americans export the
American Constitution in this way, they are not exporting American
constitutionalism. The U.S. Constitution differed in one fundamental
respect from any democratic constitution that any large state had ever
had: It was enacted through a process of popular deliberation and
consent. 7
1
For this reason, democratic constitutionalism is much more
deeply ingrained in American thought and practice (concerning our
69 Depicting the Constitution as essentially serving a process-protecting function of this
kind was Ely's solution to counter-majoritarian difficulty. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87 (1980).
70 De Maistre was among the first explicitly to advance the idea that a constitution
should express a particular people's "soul" or "character" in opposition to the idea that a
people or a constituent assembly could make a nation's constitution through a democratic
politics. See, e.g., Joseph de Maistre, Des souverainetds particulieres et de nations, in 1
CEUVRES COMPLETES 325 (1884); JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, ESSAY ON THE GENERATIVE PRIN-
CIPLE OF CONSTITUTIONS xvii (C.M. Lumbard, trans., 1977); JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, CONSID-
ERATIONS ON FRANCE 91, 97 (Richard A. Lebrun, trans., 1974).
71 See infra note 87.
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own constitutional law) than it is in contemporary European thought
and practice (concerning international law). The narrative Americans
tell themselves is that their fundamental law was made by the people.
International law does not share that narrative, and for a good reason:
International law was made in response to the most cataclysmic
expression of "popular will" the world had ever known.
Consider the differing American and European views on the
appointment of judges and, more generally, on the relationship
between politics and law. In Europe, the judicial appointment process
tends to take place within a civil service system viewed as highly insu-
lated from political pressures.72 Claims about "American realism" are
often overstated, but there is undoubtedly in the United States, as
compared to Europe, a greater understanding that all law-including
judge-made law (i.e., judicial decisions), and especially constitutional
law-is a political product. Hence if law is to remain democratically
legitimate, then the courts interpreting it must retain strong connec-
tions to the nation's democratic political system.
Americans at bottom tend to be highly skeptical about the claims
of a nonpolitical, neutral constitutional law. They are well aware that
judges' values invariably inform constitutional law. Europeans tend
to have a different attitude, which is often expressed in the form of a
more dogmatic insistence on the separateness of politics from law,
including constitutional law.73 The evolution of European thought on
this matter is a long and complicated story, which I will only outline
here.
There was for a long time a deep tradition of distrust for judges,
and especially distrust for constitutional judges, in European political
thought.74 Yet this skepticism about "government by judiciary" coex-
72 See, e.g., MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
65 (1971) (noting meritocratic, bureaucratic judicial appointment process in most Euro-
pean countries); Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1529, 1538 (2000) (same). The appointment of judges to contemporary
European constitutional courts is typically confided, however, to a legislative body, but
here too mechanisms are used to avoid "ideological" appointments. See, e.g., John
Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBLEMS 41, 65
(2002) (observing that while appointments to new constitutional courts may be made by
political bodies, supermajority requirements limit appointment of judges with "immod-
erate ideological views").
73 See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND
JUDICIALIZATION 203 (2002) ("European academic lawyers labour continuously to sepa-
rate law from politics and, by extension, to distinguish what constitutional courts do from
what political institutions do.").
74 Before the Second World War, most European states rejected judicial review on the
ground that it would establish government by judiciary and allow judges to usurp parlia-
mentary supremacy. See infra note 91; see also Mauro Cappelletti, The 'Mighty' Problem
of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis, 2 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR.
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isted with faith in an expert, neutral bureaucratic rationality and,
relatedly, in claims of universal right and in the logic of a dogmatic,
apolitical legal reason. The result was a deeply ambiguous attitude
toward judicial review and constitutional law.
This ambiguity was perfectly expressed in Hans Kelsen's tremen-
dously influential model of constitutional law, in which a judicial
council-I will call it a court, although Kelsen precisely did not-
would be charged with ensuring the conformity between govern-
mental action and the sovereign will of the people expressed in a con-
stitutional text. The Kelsenian constitutional court was not to have
jurisdiction to enforce constitutional rights, because, as Kelsen saw it,
the business of enforcing fundamental rights was so inexorably polit-
ical that judges trying to carry it out would inevitably be drawn into
the sovereign business of positive lawmaking. 75 As a result, Kelsen's
understanding of constitutional law stood in unresolved equipoise,
one foot in politics, the other in law. Constitutionalism was neutral,
rational, and legal enough to assure the conformity of state action
with fundamental structural principles. But it was not quite neutral or
rational or legal enough to assure the conformity of state action with
fundamental guarantees of justice or liberty.
Postwar-European constitutionalism has shed this equivocation.
European constitutionalism today invests courts with full jurisdiction
over constitutional rights, thus breaking radically from its Kelsenian
roots.76 But it has not yet fully confronted the significance of this
departure; it has not fully confronted the deep problems of democratic
authority created when courts arrogate to themselves the power to
interpret and enforce fundamental rights, or the truth in Kelsen's
insight that decisions about the meaning of constitutional rights are in
some ineradicable and fundamental sense political in character.77 On
INTEGRATION 1, 2 (1979) (noting historic European opposition to judicial review); Louis
Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE
INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 38, 42-44 (Louis Henkin &
Albert J. Rosenthal, eds., 1990) (same).
75 E.g., Hans Kelsen, La garantie jurisdictionnelle de la constitution, 44 R8VUE DU
DROIT PUBLIC 197 (1928); see HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 17-18 (2000) (discussing Kelsen's deliberate omis-
sion of bill of rights from his constitution to restrict tribunal to "negative lawmaking");
ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES 36 (2000) (discussing Kelsen's belief that
constitutional rights would lead to positive lawmaking by judges).
76 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 75, at 18-21; STONE SWEET, supra note 75, at 37-38.
77 As Stone Sweet puts it,
Although [European] legal scholars today appear to be parroting Kelsen's con-
stitutional theory, they also claim that constitutional courts inherently function
to protect constitutional rights, and that this function is basic to the legitimacy
of review.... [T]he orthodox position ... is that rights possess 'supraconstitu-
tional' status (their contents can not be altered by constitutional revision),
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the contrary, what makes the new European constitutionalism
cohere-what gives European constitutional courts their claim to
legitimacy-is the ideology of universal or "international human
rights," which owe their validity to no particular nation's constitution,
and which possess therefore a supranational and almost supraconstitu-
tional character, making them close to unamendable and rendering
them peculiarly fit for interpretation by international juridical experts.
Thus in European constitutionalism, there is an association
between the idea of "higher law" and that of supranational or interna-
tional law. International law is higher than local law procedurally, in
that its norms and tribunals stand above their domestic counterparts
within the legal hierarchy. More important, it is higher than national
law substantively, in that it derives from a higher source of authority
and serves higher purposes. This "higher law" status of international
law is almost an article of faith for contemporary international lawyers
and non-governmental organizations.
By contrast, in America, where judges still can decry the intro-
duction of international precedents as if they were in the presence of
the first spores of a new virus, 78 it would be nothing short of scan-
dalous to suggest that U.S. constitutional questions be decided by an
international tribunal, claiming supremacy over our legal system, as
our Supreme Court claimed supremacy over the states in the early
1800s. International law has never quite achieved higher-law status in
America; it almost has lower-law status. In the American constitu-
tional perspective, law gains no special authority by virtue of being
international law, and courts obtain no special legitimacy by virtue of
being international courts. On the contrary, from the American per-
spective, national constitutional courts, which remain embedded
within the nation's democratic processes, are an essential feature of
constitutionalism.
There are several important ways that constitutional courts and
constitutional law, on the American view, remain interwoven with the
which is akin to a natural law, not a positivist, position. In a sentence,
orthodox constitutional scholarship in Europe only selectively embraces ele-
ments of Kelsen's constitutional theory, while implicitly rejecting the funda-
mental positivism of the rest of his thinking. In consequence, Kelsenians are
led to defend what cannot be defended, namely, that constitutional judges are
only negative legislators.
STONE SWEET, supra note 75, at 135-36.
78 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll (1997) (criticizing Justice
Breyer's dissent because it "would consider the benefits that other countries, and the
European Union, believe they have derived from federal systems that are different from
ours. We think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a consti-
tution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one.").
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nation's processes of democratic self-governance. One of these, as
already noted, is the phenomenon of a politically charged judicial
nomination mechanism. But there are others: For example, (1) the
fact that the judges are themselves members of the national polity and
imbued with the nation's particular political and legal culture; (2) the
always-open possibility of amendment through national political
processes; and, perhaps most important but least understood, (3) peri-
odic but decisive contests between the judicial and political branches.
Such periodic contests are and always have been a well-known
feature of American constitutionalism. The first took place in 1800,
when Thomas Jefferson famously sought to undo the Federalist take-
over of the judiciary attempted in the waning days of the Adams
administration. 79 Jefferson largely won this battle, but the Supreme
Court might be said to have won the war, establishing its power of
judicial constitutional review in the famous case of Marbury v.
Madison.80 The most intense such battle of the twentieth century
involved Roosevelt's "court-packing plan" to overcome judicial oppo-
sition to the New Deal.81 Here the Supreme Court may be said to
have won the battle (against court packing), but lost the war.
The seismic shocks that result to the judicial and political systems
as a consequence of these periodic contests are much written about.
But these clashes are too often portrayed as crisis-like events to be
avoided at all costs, episodes in which the political branches attempt
(sometimes successfully) to overwhelm the judiciary with improper
pressures. 82 In fact, they can play a crucial role in maintaining the
79 See generally RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS
IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971) (describing conflict between Jefferson and Federalists);
JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, AND
THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES 104-90 (2002) (same).
80 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219,
221-42 (1992) (describing Marbury's historical context). Just six days after Marbury, the
Court upheld Jefferson's elimination of a number of Federalist-appointed judgeships. See
Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
81 See generally JOSEPH ALSoP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938) (detailing
history of President Roosevelt's court-packing plan); L. BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE
DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967) (same).
82 See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the
Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 88 (1998) (arguing that
"when Congress and the President have tested the constitutional limits of their power over
the courts ... the result has typically been a constitutional crisis" and rejecting notion that
such confrontations should be "held aloft as defining features of a constitutional democ-
racy in good repair"); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce.Power, 73
VA. L. REV. 1387, 1443 (1987) (decrying expansion of Commerce Clause due to pressure
from executive branch through court-packing plan).
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judiciary's embeddedness within and connections to a particular
nation's long-term democratic development.8
3
These connections are not to be thought of as failed or inchoate
substitutes for answerability to popular will. The ideal is not to make
constitutional courts responsive to popular will or to popular opinions.
If that were the ideal, regularly electing constitutional judges would be
a simpler, better means of achieving the desired result. To create a
judiciary answering to political or popular will at any given moment in
time would mark the end of judicial independence. The point is dif-
ferent: It is to create an institution of constitutional law answerable to
the nation's project of political self-determination over time.
To summarize, then, I have distinguished two conceptions of con-
stitutional law:
(1) International constitutionalism is based on the idea of uni-
versal rights and principles that derive their authority from sources
outside of or prior to national democratic processes. These rights and
principles constrain all politics, including democratic politics. Because
these rights and principles are supranational, they can and in theory
should be both designed and interpreted by neutral international
experts, rather than by national political actors, who are likely to
involve constitutional law in partisan conflict.
(2) Democratic constitutionalism regards constitutional law as
embodying a particular nation's fundamental, democratically self-
given legal and political commitments. At any given moment, these
commitments operate as checks and constraints on national demo-
cratic will, but in its creation and over time, constitutional law is not
anti-national, and it is emphatically not antidemocratic. Rather, it
aims at democracy over time. Hence it is critical for constitutional law
to be made and interpreted not by international experts, but by
national political actors and judges.
B. Three Contrasts
To bring home the differences between these two conceptions of
constitutionalism, and to indicate further the transatlantic divide
between them, let me offer a series of three contrasts. The first is
historical, the second theoretical, the third practical.
83 For an account along these lines, see Professor Whittington's nuanced description of
the court-packing episode, Keith E. Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional Crisis?, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2093, 2133-38 (2002), which precisely suggests that Roosevelt's
actions avoided a constitutional crisis and emphasizes the respects in which Roosevelt and
Congress remained within their constitutional powers even as they wrestled with a recalci-
trant Court.
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1. Historical Contrast
The historical contrast prefigured all the rest. In 1789, the revolu-
tionary national assembly of France promulgated a Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen.84 This document spoke in the language of
universal rights. The rights of man were at issue, not merely the rights
of Frenchmen.
In the same year, 1789, the American Congress promulgated a
Bill of Rights, which, far from proclaiming universal law, was not
intended even to apply to the American states.85 For example, while
the American First Amendment originally forbade national religious
establishments, it did not forbid religious establishments in the
states.86 If the peoples of the several states wanted to establish
religion, that was their business. The American Constitution spoke
not in the language of universal rights, but rather in that of popular
sovereignty.
Such is the governing myth, at any rate, of American constitu-
tional law: The supreme law is and must be the people's self-given
law. From the outset, American constitutional law was understood
not as an external force checking self-government, but as a central
piece-the most fundamental piece-of self-government itself.87 The
world-historical question posed by American constitutionalism-and
its world-historical character was understood at the time-was
whether, to quote from the first page of the Federalist Papers, a consti-
tution could be made from "reflection and choice,"'8 8 or, as Madison
would later reiterate the same point, by "deliberation and consent."8 9
In other words, American democracy would not start after the Consti-
tution was made; it was to start with the making of the Constitution
itself.
This is the reason why it is much less typical for Americans (as
compared to Europeans) to speak of "human rights." The American
Constitution does not claim the authority of universal law. It claims
rather the authority of democracy-of law made by "the People," of
84 DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN (Fr. 1789), reprinted in THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A BRIEF DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 77-79
(Lynn Hunt ed., 1996).
85 The Bill of Rights originally applied only to the federal government, not to the state
governments. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 140-45 (1998).
86 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 85, at 32-42 & 324 n.62.
87 See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 165-68 (2001) (describing act of constitution-writing in America as itself
constitutive element of democracy).
88 THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
89 THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 233 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1964).
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self-given law. "Human rights" are natural rights. Constitutional
rights are man-made.
Americans in the late eighteenth century did not invent constitu-
tional democracy. There had been democratic constitutions before,
where that term referred to a constitution establishing a democratic
(as opposed to aristocratic or monarchic) form of government. There
also had been bills of rights before, and most of the rights laid down in
the American Bill of Rights had roots in British law. But late eight-
eenth-century America did invent democratic constitutionalism.
No large state, past or present, had ever had a constitution that
was democratically made. This was the true innovation of American
constitutionalism. America added something to the idea of democ-
racy itself: Democracy was not to consist only of electoral, representa-
tive government effectuating the present will of the governed; it also
was to consist of-indeed it begins with-a constitution that was itself
democratically made, a constitution setting forth the nation's funda-
mental, self-given political and legal commitments, to endure over
time.
International constitutionalism begins instead with declarations
of universal Enlightenment rights and truths that are supposed to
supersede politics altogether. I am not saying that American constitu-
tionalism rejects the idea of universal, Enlightenment principles. The
Constitution was written and ratified by people who believed deeply
in-who participated in-the Enlightenment. Many Americans since
then have believed in Enlightenment principles. I certainly do. Our
Declaration of Independence, with its famous references to "inalien-
able" rights, and to "truths" we hold "self-evident," spoke nearly the
same language of natural law and universalism as did the French Dec-
laration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.
But the truth about self-evident truths is that they cannot govern,
not by themselves. If Enlightenment principles are to be made into
governing law, it must be done by real human beings, who will disa-
gree with one another, perhaps radically, about what the principles
are or how to interpret them or how to apply them in real life. How
are these disagreements to be resolved? The American answer was:
not by philosophers, nor by kings, nor by demagogues who claim to
speak for the people, but by the people themselves, through demo-
cratic deliberation and consent, first in the making of a Constitution,
then in the election of representatives.
2. Theoretical Contrast
The second contrast makes the same point at the level of constitu-
tional theory. Contemporary American constitutional theorists are
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2001 2004
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
unendingly concerned with the so-called "counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty"-the problem posed by the fact that constitutional law is
designed to allow unelected judges to override the outcomes of the
democratic legislative process.90 Europeans used to share this obses-
sion, which in part underlay their frequent rejection of the entire insti-
tution of constitutional law. 91 But this is no longer so. While there of
course remains anxiety in Europe about judicial overreaching in con-
stitutional matters, 92 the idea that constitutional law as such faces a
fundamental theoretical difficulty in explaining its own democratic
legitimacy-particularly in explaining the democratic legitimacy of
counter-majoritarian judicial review-no longer has nearly as much
bite in Europe as it does in America. As Professor Ferreres Comella
of Barcelona puts it:
The view has emerged in many quarters that the major problem
regarding the legitimacy of constitutional review hinges on the ques-
tion of what the constitutional court should do with a particular
statute once it appears to contravene the constitution, and not on
the question of what should be the correct interpretation of the con-
90 For the canonical formulation, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 16-17 (2d ed. 1986).
91 Throughout the nineteenth century in Europe, and in many countries until much
later, judicial review was condemned on the ground that it would violate the principle of
parliamentary supremacy. See, e.g., RAYMOND CARRE DE MALBERG, LA Loi, EXPRESSION
DE LA VOLONT GCN8RALE (1984) (describing earlier French view, dominant for almost
two centuries after French Revolution, under which judicial interference with legislation,
understood as expressing popular will, was considered criminal offense); A.V. DICEY,
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 87 (10th ed. 1959)
(1885) (arguing that no "person or body of persons, executive, legislative or judicial" in the
British Empire "can pronounce void any enactment passed by the British Parliament on
the ground of such enactment being opposed to the constitution, or on any ground
whatever, except, of course, its being repealed by Parliament"); DONALD P. KOMMERS,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 6-9
(1989) (describing German engagement with judicial review, which was once "alien to
theory of judicial decision in Germany," and general rejection of judicial review before
World War II); Michael H. Davis, The Law/Politics Distinction, the French Conseil Consti-
tutionnel, and the U.S. Supreme Court, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 45, 47 (1986) (noting France's
historical rejection of judicial review).
92 Indeed, the distinctive features of the basic model of constitutional review in
Europe-for example, the existence of a single, centralized constitutional court, "abstract"
review, and limitations on standing to sue-were arguably designed to serve democratic
ends by avoiding judicial overreaching. See STONE SWEET, supra note 75, at 32-37 (com-
paring European and American models and noting influence of Kelsen on European con-
stitutional review); Michael H. Davis, A Government of Judges: An Historical Re-View, 35
AM. J. CoMp. L. 559, 574 (1987) ("[T]he obligatory and quasi-exclusive reference to the
'Supreme Court' has become a part of our constitutional mythology, alongside other
received ideas: the American system is a good one but that system is dangerous because it
leads to a 'Government of Judges."' (quoting Louis FAVOREU, RAPPORT GeNItRAL
INTRODUCTIF, COURS CONSTITUTIONNELLES EUROPI8ENES ET DROITS FONDAMENTAUX 26
(1982))).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 79:1971
HeinOnline -- 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2002 2004
December 2004] UNILATERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
stitution, or who should have the authority to render that interpre-
tation. That a court should have the power to impose its
interpretation of the constitution on the popular branches does not
seem to some European scholars to pose an issue of democratic
legitimacy at all.
93
The reason is that European constitutionalists have internalized
the ideology of "international human rights," which causes the funda-
mental idea behind the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" to seem mis-
guided or simply obtuse. If the very point of constitutional law is to
enforce counter-majoritarian rights and thus to check democracy,
what sense can it make to charge constitutional law with being
counter-majoritarian or undemocratic? Of course constitutional law
is counter-democratic. There is no fundamental theoretical problem
of legitimacy when international constitutionalism restrains popular
sovereignty, because the validity of international human rights law
derives from sources other than (and higher than) popular sover-
eignty. As we saw earlier, the "international lawyer" holds that the
"views of political majorities are simply irrelevant to the validity" of
international human rights law, because such rights "are only mean-
ingful as counter-majoritarian rights.
'94
So described, constitutionalism is above politics. That European
constitutionalists should hold this view is unsurprising. European con-
stitutionalism-in its present, vigorous, post-Kelsenian, human-
rights-enforcing form-emerged primarily in and through interna-
tional governance, not through national democratic developments.
Thus for Europeans, the new constitutionalism is naturally perceived
as a kind of supranational juridical venture, not as a public thing, not
as something belonging to the demos and its politics.
For Americans, by contrast, constitutional law cannot be outside
politics in this fashion. It cannot merely check democracy. It must
93 Victor Ferreres Comella, The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legisla-
tion: Toward Decentralization?, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 461, 486 (2004) (citation omitted). The
major European nation for which this observation is least true is England. See, e.g., ERIC
BARENDT, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 18 (1998) ("For the most part,
lawyers and politicians [in the United Kingdom] accept the argument ...that judicial
review of legislation is undemocratic, because it may lead to the invalidation by a few
judges of a measure which had been enacted in Parliament by a democratically elected
majority."); see also Lord Browne-Wilkinson, A Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom-
The Case Against, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 435, 435-36 (1997) (stating that overwhelming
opinion in United Kingdom rejects judiciary's power to overrule Parliament). Even after
the enactment of the Human Rights Act, 1998, c.42 (Eng.), judges are not empowered to
strike down an act of Parliament as a violation of fundamental rights, but rather required,
"[s]o far as it is possible," to interpret statutes to avoid incompatibility with a number of
guarantees incorporated from the European Convention on Human Rights, id. § 3(1).
94 Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 60
(1995).
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answer to democracy. It must have its source and basis in democratic
constitutional politics. It must always be, somehow, part of politics-
part of democratic politics, writ large-even though it can invalidate
the outcomes of the democratic process at any given moment.
3. Practical Contrast
The third contrast is practical and is important to current conflicts
between Europe and the United States. It involves the question of
whether there must be one order of human rights applicable to all
nations.
On the European view, human rights transcend national politics.
Therefore, at least ideally, human rights ought to be uniform
throughout the world. By contrast, on the American view, democratic
nations can differ at least on some matters of fundamental rights.
For example, America does not take the view that every nation in
the world must see the freedom of speech as America sees it. The
freedom of speech is famously stricter and stronger in the United
States than in many other nations. In the United States, a person has
the constitutional right to make statements in favor of Nazism that
might land that person in jail in Germany.95 Yet the United States
does not demand that Germany change its law on this point or that
Germany be expelled from international organizations unless it makes
this change.
Again, in America, it has been a bedrock principle of constitu-
tional freedom for over 100 years that there must be no established
churches at any level of government.96 But the American position is
not that every country must therefore disestablish. Half the European
Union has an established religion (or what in America would be con-
sidered an establishment of religion). 97 Democratic nations, from an
American point of view, can disagree about this principle.
But turn to the death penalty and to contemporary European
attitudes about it. Capital punishment is now viewed as a human
rights violation by the European community, and on this ground,
95 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the
American and European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 343-44 (1999).
96 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878).
97 England, Greece, Denmark, Sweden and Finland essentially have national churches,
and other European states, such as Spain and Italy, grant particular churches (the Catholic
church, in Spain's case) special recognition or privileges. See CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM
OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 19-22 (2001)
(describing various state-church relationships in Europe); Dr. Sophie C. van Bijsterveld,
Church and State in Western Europe and the United States: Principles and Perspectives,
2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 989 (same).
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Europeans routinely excoriate the United States, where the death
penalty remains in force in some jurisdictions. 98 European diplomats
and politicians occasionally call for the United States to be expelled
from international organizations because of this "human rights
violation." 99
This position is logical given the European conception of consti-
tutionalism. Human rights are "universal." Therefore, once the death
penalty has been deemed a human rights violation, it is a scandal if
any nation refuses to recognize it.
For Europeans, one great marker of successful constitutional
development is international consensus and uniformity. International-
ists will point to such consensus as if it were supremely validating-as
if the fact of agreement on the death penalty throughout the "interna-
tional community" were itself a source of legal validation and
authority. In this, they may be following the rhetoric of the "jus
cogens" and "customary international law,"'100 but there is also the
added feature that, from a European point of view, the asserted
universality of human rights means that these rights ought to be uni-
versally accepted. If a right is universal, it ought to be in force every-
where. A "fundamental difference in values" on constitutional rights
is, as such, problematic and "deplorable," 101 while consensus becomes
a marker of success, a proof that the agreed-upon principle really has
98 See Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century,
46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 293, 309-10 n.41 (2002) ("In many European capitals, outrage over
American capital punishment has triggered angry street demonstrations, with one former
U.S. ambassador even reporting that his embassy has receivied an anti-death penalty peti-
tion signed by 500,000 local citizens.").
99 The Council of Europe repeatedly promises to expel the United States from its
observer status in that body on this ground. E.g., Abolition of the Death Penalty in Council
of Europe Observer States, Res. 1253 (June 25, 2001), http://assembly.coe.int/documents/
adoptedtext/ta01/eres1253.htm (last visited October 25, 2004) [hereinafter Abolition of the
Death Penalty]; see also, e.g., Koh, supra note 98, at 310 ("I have little doubt that America's
continuation of the practice has undermined our claim to moral leadership in international
human rights, and probably contributed to our recent, stunning loss of the United States'
seat on the United Nations Human Rights Commission.").
100 According to these doctrines, a norm of international law-indeed even a treaty-
can become "binding on all states," even those that have not consented to it, just by virtue
of its widespread acceptance by other states. See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal Interna-
tional Law, 87 AM. J. INr'L L. 529, 541 (1993). For a case in point, see Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, How to Reform the United Nations: Lessons from the International Economic
Law Revolution, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 185, 186 (1997-98), stating that "the
increasing number and membership of worldwide and regional human rights conventions
have led to the widely-held view that the majority of the human rights listed in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights have become customary law binding on all states."
101 See Abolition of the Death Penalty, supra note 99, § 10 ("The Assembly deplores the
fundamental difference in values regarding the abolition of the death penalty between the
Council of Europe on the one hand and Japan and the United States on the other hand.").
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the universality claimed for it. The more consensus and uniformity
there is throughout the international community concerning a consti-
tutional principle, the greater the strength of that principle, and the
greater the constitutional success is considered to be.
Americans do not always understand this view. At any rate, they
do not always share it. In American constitutionalism, the U.S. Con-
stitution is supposed to reflect our own fundamental legal and political
commitments-not a set of commitments that all civilized nations
must share. It is the self-givenness of the Constitution, not its univer-
sality, that gives it authority as law. Hence consensus in the "interna-
tional community" cannot be regarded in the United States as the
compelling source of legal or constitutional authority that it is often
made out to be in Europe.
Thus unilateralism has staying power in American foreign policy
not only for reasons of self-interest. It also reflects an American com-
mitment to democratic constitutionalism-which is to say, to self-gov-
ernment. Europe does not share this commitment in quite the same
way or to the same degree. The continental European understanding
of the state tends to favor centralized government, 10 2 so it is not
entirely surprising that European nations should be relatively more
comfortable with governance by international experts, dispensing
Enlightenment reason and bureaucratic rationality, from their offices
in Belgium or Strasbourg. The cataclysmic lessons of the twentieth
century may make this path the right one for Europe. That does not
make it right for the United States.
IV
Is INTERNATIONAL LAW REALLY ANTIDEMOCRATIC?
I have said that international law today rests on a fundamentally
antidemocratic conception of fundamental law in tension with
American understandings and American commitments to self-govern-
ment. Many, however, would dispute the assertion that international
law today is antidemocratic. This section examines that assertion with
greater care, responding to certain objections that might be made
against it.
A. Treaties are Democratically Ratified
A first objection is that I have overlooked an obvious, decisive
fact: All U.S. treaties must be ratified by the Senate and hence are
themselves democratically enacted. The whole idea (it will be said)
102 See, e.g., LARRY SIEDENrop, DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE 102-21 (2001) (describing
three different "models of the state" vying for influence in European Union).
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that international law is antidemocratic is therefore false. So long as
treaties require ratification by democratically elected representatives,
where is the problem?
The most direct answer to this problem can be given in three
words: the European Union. The E.U. is a creation of international
treaties, each one of which was enacted by democratically elected offi-
cials in the several states that have subscribed to them. If that fact
alone were sufficient to make international governance democratic,
the famous "democratic deficit" in the E.U. could not exist. To
observe that the E.U. suffers from a "democratic deficit" would
involve some kind of intellectual confusion. But the E.U.'s demo-
cratic deficiencies are real, 10 3 and they demonstrate that treaty-
making in international law does not guarantee the creation of demo-
cratic governance regimes.
As in the United States, treaty formation in most countries is gov-
erned by a special process in which, characteristically, the legislature
plays a lesser role. 1°4 Historically, there is no particular difficulty
understanding this. Given an international law world in which treaties
largely concerned state-to-state or even "prince-to-prince" relations, it
was natural to confide the treaty power largely to the crown or, later,
to the executive branch of government. The ordinary legislative pro-
cess could be more popular-i.e., more democratic-because ordinary
legislation concerned matters directly of popular concern, while the
treaty-making process concerned matters outside the people's ken and
was therefore properly insulated or distanced from the more demo-
cratic branches of government. Today, however, as treaties impinge
increasingly on domestic affairs, the old forms of treaty formation
have less to recommend them.
Treaties are exceptions to ordinary lawmaking. Not only are they
made outside the ordinary, democratic lawmaking process, but they
can also claim to impose obligations on a country that the nation's
legislature cannot thereafter amend or undo. 05 Ordinarily, what one
103 For a careful exposition of the antidemocratic leanings shown so far in the Euro-
pean-integration movement, see id. at 1, 24, 102; J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF
EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EURO-
PEAN INTEGRATION 77-86, 349-56 (1999). For additional discussions, see Jirgen
Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe, 12
PRAXIS INT'L 1, 7-13 (1992); Giandomenico Majone, Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The
Question of Standards, 4 EUR. L.J. 5, 5-7, 14-27 (1998); Thomas W. Pogge, Creating Supra-
National Institutions Democratically: Reflections on the European Union's "Democratic
Deficit," 5 J. POL. PHIL. 163, 163 (1997).
104 For a useful survey of numerous states' treaty-making processes, see COUNCIL OF
EUR., EXPRESSION OF CONSENT BY STATES TO BE BOUND BY A TREATY (1987).
105 In the European Union, domestic courts are empowered or required to set aside
national legislation when incompatible with European Community law. See generally THE
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legislature does, a later legislature can undo. A past legislature, in
principle, cannot bind a future one. This basic rule of democratic leg-
islation ensures that law made today is always subject to repeal
through the ordinary democratic process tomorrow. The great excep-
tion to this rule is of course constitutional law, the importance of
which precisely lies in the fact that it cannot be changed through the
ordinary legislative process. This is why constitutional enactments are
of special concern in democratic countries, demanding specially
heightened forms of democratic mobilization and participation if they
are to claim legitimate authority.
But treaties also can present themselves as exceptions to this fun-
damental rule of democratic legislation. Treaties can also claim to be
law beyond the power of a democratic legislature to change. Yet
unlike constitutions, treaties require less, not more, democratic mobil-
ization and participation in order to be enacted. They are drafted fre-
quently in secret, signed by executive officers, usually presented to
legislators on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and in the United States do
not even require the consent of the more representative house.
Hence their claim to supersede the ordinary legislative process is
highly problematic from the democratic point of view. 1
06
EUROPEAN COURT AND THE NATIONAL COURTS-DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE:
LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT chs. 1-7 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1997)
[hereinafter THE EUROPEAN COURT AND THE NATIONAL COURTS] (describing accommo-
dations to this principle in national legal systems of different member states). In some
European states, all treaties have a status superior to domestic legislation. In the Nether-
lands, for example, the constitution makes national statutes inapplicable if they conflict
with an international treaty-while, interestingly, barring judges from invalidating a statute
(but not a treaty) if it conflicts with the constitution. See NETHERLANDS CONsT. arts. 94,
104. For a general survey of the effects of treaties under the domestic law of various Euro-
pean nations and the United States, see 7 UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW (Francis G. Jacobs &
Shelley Roberts eds., 1987) [hereinafter THE EFFECT OF TREATIES].
106 As Benvenisti puts it, ratification cannot cure the democratic difficulties in the
treaty-making process, which
permits very little public scrutiny of the negotiators' acts and omissions
because ratification does not allow for amendments; thus many alternatives
necessarily remain unexplored. Even the domestic debate on ratification often
remains clouded because the access of the public and legislators to information
concerning international negotiations is invariably limited. Little is known
about the options offered and discussed, as negotiators have little incentive to
provide accurate information on their performance to the general public.
Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 200
(1999) (internal footnotes omitted); see also Robert Howse, Transatlantic Regulatory
Cooperation and the Problem of Democracy, in TRANSLATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPER-
ATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 469-80 (George A. Bermann et al.
eds., 2000) (analyzing different models of democracy and their implication for transatlantic
regulatory cooperation).
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In the United States, this problem is ameliorated to some extent
by our rule that a subsequently enacted congressional statute super-
sedes a treaty. 10 7 International lawyers are sometimes scandalized
when they learn of this rule.108 It is incomprehensible to some of
them that the United States could so overtly, so officially, declare that
it regards itself free, as a legal matter, to dishonor its international law
obligations if it chooses to do so.
Here, then, is another manifestation not only of the fundamental
difference between American and European conceptions of constitu-
tional democracy but of the implications of this difference for interna-
tional law. The fact that the President chiefly manages U.S. foreign
relations exacerbates, rather than relieves, American constitutional
anxieties about the ability of treaties to override the ordinary legisla-
tive process. From the American point of view, when treaty law and
statutory law are compared, it is not a mark in a treaty's favor that it is
brought into effect by the President, with the consent of the Senate,
rather than through the ordinary legislative process. 10 9 Thus it is
107 See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (rejecting Paraguayan citizen's
habeas corpus petition based on violations of Vienna Convention due to subsequently
enacted Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996). The later-in-time rule,
which also permits a subsequent treaty to override a prior statute, is often traced to Taylor
v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,749) (Curtis, J., on circuit), affd on
other grounds, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862).
108 And not only Europeans: Consider the reaction of the Chinese foreign minister to
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889), where
the Court upheld a federal statute despite its violation of a treaty guaranteeing rights of
Chinese immigrants residing in America before 1880 to leave and re-enter the United
States freely:
In my country we have acted upon the conviction that where two nations delib-
erately and solemnly entered upon treaty stipulations they thereby formed a
sacred compact from which they could not be honorably discharged except
through friendly negotiations and a new agreement. I was, therefore, not pre-
pared to learn through the medium of that great tribunal that there was a way
recognized in the law and practice of this country whereby your Government
could release itself from treaty obligations without consultation with or the
consent of the other party to what we had been accustomed to regard as a
sacred instrument.
Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'L
L. 313, 317-18 (2001) (quoting Letter from Chang Yen Hoon, Minister Plenipotentiary of
China, to James G. Blaine, U.S. Secretary of State (July 8, 1889), 1890 FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 132, 133).
109 In holding that treaties are "subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforce-
ment, modification, or repeal" the Supreme Court relied on the democratic deficiencies of
the treaty process:
A treaty is made by the President and the Senate. Statutes are made by the
President, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The addition of the
latter body to the other two in making a law certainly does not render it less
entitled to respect in the matter of its repeal or modification than a treaty
made by the other two. If there be any difference in this regard, it would seem
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unsurprising that the United States should have settled long ago on
the rule that an act of Congress trumps a treaty.
By contrast, the European commitment to international law rests
on the idea that international law is superior to domestic law. If it
were not, international law could not accomplish its essential objec-
tive, which is to check national sovereignty, including national popular
sovereignty. Formally, a number of European states have the same
rule as does the United States (under which a later-enacted statute
supersedes a treaty),11o but the European Community framework
depends on the idea of the supremacy of Community law over
domestic legislation, just as European lawyers, in their attitude toward
human rights law, characteristically assume the supremacy of interna-
tional human rights conventions. In these ways, international treaty
law functions in Europe as a constitutional-law substitute, presenting
itself as a body of higher law that checks the power of ordinary
national legislatures."' International constitutionalism celebrates this
result; American constitutionalism resists it.
More fundamentally, while international law can of course be jus-
ticiable in national courts, the natural juridical destination of interna-
tional law is an international tribunal, if for no reason other than that
the interpretation of international law by national courts will always
be vulnerable to charges of partisanship. In 2003, I attended a
meeting of mostly Latin American lawyers, where the question of the
legality of the Guantdinamo detentions was discussed. A consensus
quickly emerged that American courts should not have jurisdiction to
decide this question; the issue involved international law, and a dis-
pute over international law called for "neutral" judges. Only an inter-
national tribunal could claim this neutrality.
The shift from national courts to international tribunals has
serious implications for democracy. These implications are not
apparent to most internationalists, whose thinking runs as follows:
Once an issue is taken to be a matter of law, particularly a matter of
constitutional law, the issue has been removed from the political
domain. And once this has been done-once an issue has been placed
to be in favor of an act in which all three of the bodies participate. And such
is, in fact, the case in a declaration of war, which must be made by Congress,
and which, when made, usually suspends or destroys existing treaties between
the nations thus at war.
Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
110 See Francis G. Jacobs, Introduction to THE EFFEcr OF TREATIES, supra note 105, at
xxviii-xxix.
111 See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community, in
THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 105, at 305-08 (describing
the "process of constitutionalising the treaty system" that has taken place in Europe).
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in the domain of law, rather than politics-then democratic principles
have little to say about whether the court that decides the law is a
national or international court. What counts is that the court gets the
law right. Hence the only question is which tribunal is likely to be the
better, more impartial adjudicator. If a society is prepared to
judicialize an issue, doesn't that mean the society wants to see the
issue resolved by nonpolitical actors?
The answer is no-at least from the American perspective.
Judges may, in one sense, be nonpolitical actors, but the judiciary is
nevertheless a governmental institution, embedded within a larger
political process, and it makes a great difference, democratically
speaking, whether adjudication occurs in national or international
courts. As noted earlier, the many indirect connections between a
nation's judiciary and its democratic processes are critical to ensuring
that law retains its claim to legitimate authority in a society that claims
to be self-governing.
The ordinarily subordinate relationship of court to legislature,
together with the embeddedness of the judiciary within a larger demo-
cratic political process, is overturned by the phenomenon of interna-
tional tribunals. These tribunals do not stand clearly below any
particular nation's legislature. They do not answer to any nation's leg-
islature. They may, moreover, lay claim to an authority superior to-
not reversible by-any nation's legislature. When the power of funda-
mental lawmaking inherent in judicial review is confided to an inter-
national tribunal, the aspirations of democratic constitutionalism have
been left behind, replaced by those of international constitutionalism.
An internationalist might reply that courts do not "make law"
and hence that the difficulty I'm describing does not exist. This
response would only highlight the point made above: The internation-
alist perspective relies on a belief in the separability of law from
politics that rings false to American ears. And it probably will begin
to ring false to European ears before too long, if it has not begun to
do so already.
B. World Government Without World Democracy
Another objection to the argument I have made would run as
follows. International law is not inherently antidemocratic. If there
were a world legislative body effectively representing democratic
world opinion, international law could be perfectly democratic. Thus
if the United States is genuinely interested in democracy, unilater-
alism is not the way to achieve it. Couldn't we instead work to create
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global democratic institutions and thus bring about world democ-
racy-governance by world public opinion?
Yes, but there is no world democracy at present, and no realistic
prospect of it. The U.N. General Assembly is not a representative
body of world opinion; it is composed of unelected delegates, many of
whom are appointed by autocratic regimes. The rule of one-state-one-
vote, which governs in the General Assembly, also can distort claims
of "world opinion."
Even if there were a realistic prospect of world democracy today,
it is not clear that the United States should support it. World public
opinion would very likely be, if not anti-American, unfriendly to many
of the interests, principles, and values that Americans consider impor-
tant. More than this, the choice between world democracy and a
world of democracies does not obviously favor the former. A world
of democracies, in which independent nation-states each have their
own self-given constitution, offers possibilities of heterogeneity that
world democracy might lack.
To be sure, the alliance of democracy with the nation-state is a
contingent historical fact. According to Habermas, the alliance is a
fortuitous, unfortunate product of the fact (or what he takes to be the
fact) that democracy and the nation-state emerged at the same histor-
ical moment-"twins born of the French Revolution."'1 12  But
Habermas's anti-nationalism is characteristically European. It is
simultaneously Franco-centric, tracing both democracy and
nationhood to the French Revolution, and Germano-phobic, trauma-
tized by the Second World War. If the nation-state and democracy are
"twins," there are at least two sets of these twins, and the set born a
few years before the French Revolution, on the other side of the
Atlantic, did not undergo the same development and the same
traumas that might demand a separation of the later-born pair.
International constitutionalism, which Habermas favors, does
damage to the prospects for variation, experimentation, and pluralism
that national democracy opens up. So long as democracy is allied with
national self-government-rather than with world governance-
112 According to Habermas:
Nation-state and democracy are twins born of the French Revolution ....
National consciousness and republican conviction in a sense proved themselves
in the willingness to fight and die for one's country. This explains the comple-
mentary relation that originally obtained between nationalism and republi-
canism: one became the vehicle for the emergence of the other. However, this
social-psychological connection does not mean the two are linked at the con-
ceptual level.
Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy 493, 495 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
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democracy remains an experimental ideal, dedicated to the possibility
of variation, perhaps radical variation, among different peoples.
Democratic national constitutionalism may be parochial within a
given nation, but it is cosmopolitan across nations. 113 Democratic
peoples are permitted, even expected, to take different paths. They
are permitted, even expected, to go to hell in their own way.
C. International Law as a Precondition of Democracy
A final objection: The fundamental rights and processes that
international law protects are not antidemocratic; they are necessary
conditions of democracy. As such, they enable democracy to exist,
regardless of whether they themselves were democratically enacted.
Indeed, it is a logical error to demand that these rights and processes
be themselves made, interpreted, or enforced through democratic
channels. These rights and processes are prior to democracy. They
are implicit in democracy's first principles. Because they are democ-
racy's "necessary conditions," they may or perhaps even must (in this
view) be imposed undemocratically from above.
In certain contexts, there is substance to this objection. For failed
states, or societies making a transition from autocracy to self-rule,
international law and international bodies can clearly help to bring
about democratization, if only by assisting in the implementation of
elections. But as applied to states with functioning democratic
processes, international law cannot claim this initial, democracy-inau-
gurating mantle.
With respect to democratic states, the claim that international law
protects democracy's "necessary conditions" is not incoherent, but it is
deeply implausible. Yes, most of us may find appeal in this argument
some of the time-when discussing the international law we support.
But we will suddenly see its holes as soon as the discussion turns to
other aspects of international governance we do not find so appealing.
Consider the peculiar inconsistency that has characteristically
eaten away at the familiar American "right-wing," pro-unilateralist
position. Proponents of this position frequently ridicule international
law and international institutions. America, it is said, should resist the
very idea of "international norms" that "make it harder and harder
for the United States to act independently in its own legitimate
113 On the virtues of "democratic experimentalism," see generally ROBERTO MAN-
GABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE (1998), and
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
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interest. 11 4 The United States has no reason to submit to a "U.N.
bureaucracy supposedly representing 'all mankind." 115 International
courts cannot be trusted because they are "[u]nchecked by [the] dem-
ocratic institutions of a sovereign state[.] ' 116 Above all, the United
States must insist on its right of self-determination: "[T]he course of
this nation does not depend on the decisions of others.'
1 17
Below this unilateralist drumbeat, however, a different tune is
played. The same people who make these statements turn out to be
champions of international law-when the subject turns to economics.
The current administration rejects the International Criminal Court,
but supports NAFTA,"1 8 which subjects the United States to the juris-
diction of international trade tribunals 1 9 and promotes international
free trade and intellectual-property agreements all over the world.'
20
Those who deride "'international norms" on the topic of human
rights somehow feel quite differently about the international "prin-
ciple" enforced by the WTO. 12 ' Those who typically insist on
American sovereignty somehow overcome that anxiety when the topic
turns to trade.'2 2 The Wall Street Journal, which no one could accuse
of left-wing sympathies, becomes a veritable one-worlder on the sub-
ject of NAFTA:
Reformist Mexican President Vicente Fox raises eyebrows with his
suggestion that over a decade or two Nafta should evolve into some-
thing like the European Union .... He can rest assured that there
114 John R. Bolton, Kofi Annan's U.N. Power Grab, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 4,
1999, at 13-14. Mr. Bolton is Undersecretary of State.
115 William Safire, The Purloined Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2001, at A17.
116 Editorial, Washington Post v. International Law, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2002, http://
www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110001883.
117 George W. Bush, The State of the Union (Jan. 28, 2003), reported in President's State
of the Union Message to Congress and the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at A12.
118 See, e.g., Joint Press Statement, Bush & Fox, supra note 50.
119 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 11, 32 I.L.M. 296 (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1994), implemented by North American Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993). On NAFTA's tribunals, see
infra note 138.
120 See supra note 52.
121 John R. Bolton, Beijing's WTO Double-Cross; Surprise! China is Trying to Keep
Taiwan Out of the World Trade Organization, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 14, 2000, at 19,
20 ("Defending the integrity of the WTO against Beijing's efforts to politicize it [by
excluding Taiwan] reflects a deep commitment both to the principle of free trade and to
the long-term viability of the WTO as an institution.").
122 See, e.g., William Safire, Laughter After Nafta, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at A21
("[T]he America-lasters ... would have us believe a free trade bloc on our side of the
Atlantic and Pacific somehow dilutes U.S. sovereignty. Baloney.").
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is one voice north of the Rio Grande that supports his vision. To
wit, this newspaper.
123
A mirror-image self-contradiction appears on the "left."
According to a familiar left-wing critique of globalization, multilateral
forces such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WTO
are choking off the freedom of developing countries to chart their
own, differing economic, cultural, and social paths. This critique
deploys arguments that sound quite hostile to international law in
general. Thus when Amnesty International challenges the IMF and
supranational corporations, it writes that a "new breed of world
'super-bodies"' is trying to dictate policy to poorer countries,
"leav[ing] the governments with little power to make their own
choices or control their nation's affairs.1 2
4
But "world 'super-bodies"' are evidently unattractive only on
economic matters. Amnesty International is of course an avid propo-
nent of "world 'super-bodies"' on matters of human rights, the use of
military force, the prosecution of war crimes, and so on.125 A world
economic order is a threat to national self-determination, but a world
order on capital punishment or environmental protection somehow is
not. When it comes to human rights or environmental protection, the
left's anxiety about denying developing nations the power to "make
their own choices or control their nation's affairs" tends to disappear.
These complementary left- and right-wing contradictions are not
hard to explain. Both sides essentially raise the same objection when
they are objecting to internationalism: International law is
antidemocratic. The right tends to make this claim in terms of "U.S.
sovereignty," while the left tends to speak of "U.S. hegemony," but
these are two sides of a single coin. The right-wing argument about
"U.S. sovereignty" is an argument about America's right to govern
itself. The left-wing argument about "U.S. hegemony" is an argument
about other nations' right to govern themselves. But both sides forget
about international law's antidemocratic qualities when international
law promotes the goals they like.
123 Robert L. Bartley, Editorial, Open NAFTA Borders? Why Not?, WALL ST. J., July 2,
2001, at A15.
124 Amnesty Int'l, AI on Human Rights and Labor Rights, in THE GLOBALIZATION
READER 187, 188 (Frank J. Lechner & John Boli eds., 2000); see, e.g., OXFAM INT'L,
DEMOCRACY AND ACcoUNTABILITY: THE IMF's DEFICIT, INTERNATIONAL BRIEFING
PAPER, SEPT. 2000 (on file with author).
125 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE Now! TIME FOR AN EFFECTIVE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Al Index: IOR 40/15/98, May 1, 1998), at http://web.
amnesty.org/library/index/ENGIOR400151998; OXFAM INT'L, UP IN ARMS: CONTROL-
LING THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SMALL ARMS (Jul. 2001), at http://www.oxfamamerica.
org/pdfs/upinarms.pdf.
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It is just here that the argument from democracy's "necessary
conditions" becomes superficially appealing to both camps. Conserv-
atives will claim that strong property rights, takings law, and a market
economy are essential preconditions of a flourishing democracy. To
this argument, the left will quickly and plausibly reply that the exis-
tence of property rights and a capitalist economy, or at the least the
particular form this should take, is very much a matter for indepen-
dent nations to decide for themselves. 126 In other words, the left
would see through arguments for the transcendental democratic
necessity of the IME or WTO, insisting on the possibilities for signifi-
cant economic variation among self-governing states.
But the left will then insist that the international order it cham-
pions-a world human rights order, along with perhaps a world envi-
ronmental and military order-is a precondition of democracy. From
this perspective, an international legal regime that forced the United
States to abolish its death penalty laws, or forced Islamic states to
abolish their veil laws, would not be acting antidemocratically, regard-
less of whether the abolished laws had been democratically enacted.
On the contrary, capital punishment and the veiling of women are
matters of "human rights," and human rights are necessary conditions
of democracy's possibility. Again, there is nothing incoherent in the
abstract about such claims, but they are neither persuasive nor candid.
Abolishing the death penalty can notionally be thought of as a
precondition to democracy-or a "necessary implication" of the right
to "equal respect" that democracy "entails"-but the argument is
makeshift. If we oppose the death penalty, we almost certainly do so
because of views we hold about the requirements of justice and
morality independent of the requirements of democracy. If we
oppose Islamic laws requiring women to wear veils, we do so because
we have a certain view about sexual equality, not because such laws
could not be democratic in a particular society. Someone who means
genuinely to promote and defend democracy in the Islamic world
ought to be prepared to respect its outcomes-even if, at least to some
substantial degree, that means respecting the right of Islamic societies
to diverge from us on matters of sex equality, the proper relationship
between church and state, and so on.
There is such a thing as illiberal democracy, just as there is such a
thing as non-capitalist democracy, and if we are to be candid, we will
not pretend otherwise. To the liberal's claim that human rights, as
126 See, e.g., Robert Howse, The Boundaries of the WTO: From Politics to Technoc-
racy-and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 94,
98-106 (2002).
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propounded by the "international community," are necessary condi-
tions or implications of democracy, the right will plausibly reply that
the existence of these rights, or at the very least the particular form
they should take, is very much a matter on which democratic nations
may differ.
The question of democracy's preconditions is difficult and much
belabored. This much, however, is certain: Claims that any particular
legal order is a transcendental democratic necessity should be
received with extreme skepticism. 127 We usually see through these
claims when made on behalf of ideologies or policies with which we
disagree; we ought be equally skeptical of these claims when made on
behalf of ideologies or policies we favor.
The fact is that there are some rights or principles that many
value more than we value democratic self-government itself. For the
right, property rights have always been more likely to trump democ-
racy. For the left, human rights, the use of force, and environmental
protection are more likely to do so. These rights seem to people to
"trump" democracy not because they are democracy's "precondi-
tions," but because, quite simply, they seem more important than
democracy.
That is why the right is internationalist where international law
pursues a property- and commerce-protecting agenda, while the left is
internationalist where international law pursues an human rights or
use-of-force or environmental protection agenda. In each case, sup-
port for international law is adventitious. If the WTO began imposing
serious wealth redistribution all over the world (in the name of "fair
trade"), while the International Court of Justice prohibited abortion
and mandated the death penalty for certain crimes (in the name of the
"human rights of the fetus and the crime victim"), left- and right-
wingers would quickly reverse their current alignments. The right
would presumably discover that the WTO is a threat to national sov-
ereignty, while the left would presumably begin resisting the
hegemony of international human rights law.
D. International Law and Democracy
International law is antidemocratic. The existing international
governance organizations are famous for their undemocratic opacity,
remoteness from popular or representative politics, elitism, and unac-
127 See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 7
(1996) (defining "institutional fetishism" as "the belief that abstract institutional concep-
tions, like political democracy, the market economy, and a free civil society, have a single
natural and necessary institutional expression").
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countability. 2 8 International governance institutions and their
officers tend to be bureaucratic, diplomatic, technocratic-everything
but democratic. That is why internationalization, as the sociologist
and former German member of parliament Sir Ralf Dahrendorf puts
it, "almost invariably means a loss of democracy.
'129
In the last ten years or so, it became common for internationalists
to reply to this problem by pointing to the growing influence of non-
governmental organizations (NGO) in international law circles, as if
these equally unaccountable, self-appointed, unrepresentative NGOs
somehow exemplified world public opinion, and as if the
antidemocratic nature of international governance were a kind of
small accountability hole that these NGOs could plug. 130 This invoca-
tion of NGOs as world democratizers served only to highlight how out
of touch many internationalists are with what would be actually neces-
sary to democratize international law. The brute fact is that there is
no world democratic polity today; the largest entities in which democ-
racy exists are nation-states. As a result, international law can and
does frequently conflict with democracy.
The problem is not only institutional-a matter of making inter-
national bodies more "transparent" or "accountable." The problem is
also ideological. There is an antidemocratic worldview built into the
fundamental premises of a good deal of international law thought and
128 See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 103, chs. 2, 10; Robert 0. Keohane, International Insti-
tutions: Can Interdependence Work?, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1998, at 82, 92 (arguing that
European-level actions remain little scrutinized by national parliaments and voters); James
N. Rosenau, Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World, in RE-IMAGINING POLIT-
ICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 28 (Daniele Archibugi et al.
eds., 1998) [hereinafter RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY] (arguing that democracy
as known within countries does not exist on global level); Eric Stein, International Integra-
tion and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 489 (2001) (discussing
increasing strain on democracy as institutions of international integration are made
stronger).
129 Ralf Dahrendorf, The Third Way and Liberty: An Authoritarian Streak in Europe's
New Center, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 13, 16.
130 For a very effective description and critique of the symbiotic "romance" of interna-
tional-governance institutions with non-governmental institutions (NGO), see Kenneth
Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-
Governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L.
91, 104-19 (2000); see also Richard Falk, The United Nations and Cosmopolitan Democ-
racy: Bad Dream, Utopian Fantasy, Political Project, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMU-
NITY, supra note 128, at 308, 321-28, discussing influence of NGOs on U.N. conferences
commenting on major policy issues and arguing that enduring results of participation are
questionable; Beate Kohler-Koch, Organized Interests in European Integration: The Evolu-
tion of a New Type of Governance, in PARTICIPATION AND POLICY-MAKING IN THE EURO-
PEAN UNION 42, 54-56 (Helen Wallace & Alasdair R. Young eds., 1997), arguing that
institutional reform and not just broader access for affected parties is necessary to achieve
actual accountability and transparency.
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practice. This worldview finds its clearest expression in the interna-
tional human rights discourse, where the views of democratic majori-
ties in a given country or, indeed, throughout the entire world, will be
said to be "simply irrelevant" to the validity and authority of interna-
tional law:
[Tlhe international lawyer [holds] that there are certain things a
society cannot choose to do to itself. Where ... human rights are
concerned, international law looks past the fiction which underlies
the social contract metaphor and prescribes rules regarding indi-
vidual citizens. The views of political majorities are simply irrele-
vant to the validity of such rules. Indeed, these rules are only
meaningful as counter-majoritarian rights .... 131
Democracy does not have much standing here. Consider how
this view would regard the controversy over the death penalty, which
the "international community" condemns as a violation of human
rights law. Actual public opinion in Europe, however, tends to favor
capital punishment, in some countries at about the same rate as in the
United States.132 For the "international lawyer," however, this fact is
"simply irrelevant." Because the "social contract" is a "fiction"-
which means, presumably, that not every individual really consents to
the state's authority-"international law" is somehow entitled to step
into the breach and, where "human rights are concerned," to "pre-
scribe [the] rules.'
33
International free trade law may not speak in quite the same lan-
guage, but it is plainly (and sometimes openly) even more
antidemocratic. After all, one of the express goals of free trade law is
to circumvent domestic democratic politics on trade issues, which
might in any given country at any given time happen to favor pro-
nationalization, protectionist, worker-safety, environmental-protec-
tion or other goals above the benefits of investment and trade.
34
Democracy, pro-freetraders will say, lets farmers or labor unions use
their voting power to buy rent-seeking deals from government; as a
131 Fox & Nolte, supra note 94, at 60.
132 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Morato-
rium Movement in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 83-88 (2002) (discussing polls
showing that majorities of population in Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and
Austria supported death penalty despite legislation against it).
133 Fox & Nolte, supra note 94, at 60.
134 See, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral
Cooperation and the World Trade Organization: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE
MILLENNIUM 264, 264-91 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (arguing that international
economic regimes were expressly designed to keep public and officials or representatives
from other branches out of trade decisions).
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result, free trade, which promises benefits to all, needs to be protected
from the inefficiencies of democratic politics.
Thus the left is correct to say that international economic regimes
can be deeply antidemocratic, and the right is correct to say the same
of international human rights regimes. Left and right are both right,
but both have left something out. They omit to mention that the very
objection they make to internationalism applies to the international
law they support.
Democracy is not the only value in the world. International law
could be worth supporting even if it is antidemocratic. The point is a
matter of candor. To support international law is to support funda-
mental constraints on democracy. International law is by design a
constraint on popular sovereignty. It was designed, in the wake of
World War II, to be made, interpreted, and enforced by international
actors operating at a considerable remove from popular democratic
politics. It has developed in accordance with this design.
Most of us see this some of the time, but few see it all the time,
because most of us tend to fall, to one extent or another, into the trap
just described. When international law pursues results we're against,
we see the threat it poses to self-government, whether our own or
others'. We overcome this scruple, however, when international law
promotes goals we favor. To be sure, we will not readily admit that
the principles we like-the right principles, the ones we want interna-
tional law to protect-are antidemocratic. We will say, instead, that
they are "part of" democracy, that they are implications or "necessary
conditions" of democracy, "properly understood." If we lean to the
right, we will have property rights primarily in mind; if to the left,
human rights.
Candor would be better served if we forthrightly acknowledged
the highly problematic relationship between international law and
democracy. The whole point of international law, in its present form,
is to supersede the outcomes of political processes, including demo-
cratic processes. If, therefore, Americans remain committed to self-
government, they do in fact have reason to resist international govern-
ance today.
Some moral philosophers today like to defend the rights they like
by asserting that these rights derive from the concept of democracy
itself, or from the principles on which democracy rests.' 35 So we are
to believe that illiberal democracy, or illiberal "constitutional" democ-
racy, is somehow a contradiction in terms. But of course there will be
135 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 15-35 (1996) (advancing concept of
"constitutional" democracy, demanding respect for certain democratic conditions).
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many different philosophers offering different accounts of the rights
that "derive" from democracy's first principles. Undoubtedly, some
minimal rights of voting and speaking can be persuasively grounded in
an account of democracy's pre-conditions, but beyond that, to adjudi-
cate among different versions of democracy's fundamental rights,
democracy allows but one solution: democracy itself.
VI
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
I am not arguing in any categorical sense against international
law as such. The task ahead is to think much more clearly about the
kinds of international governance we ought to support and the con-
texts in which we ought to support it. This section offers suggestions
along these lines.
A. Limitations of Democracy
First of all, against brutal dictatorships and in failed states, the
case I have made against international governance does not apply at
all. Post-World War II Germany and Japan offer examples of states
where the forcible imposition of international governance for a period
of time worked to make democracy possible. If the world is fortunate,
international governance may prove equally successful in the states of
the former Yugoslavia. The antidemocratic nature of international
law hardly counts against it when it is applied to states with no pre-
tense to democracy in the first place.
Second, democracy is not the only value in the political world.
There may be states so desperately poor that they prize economic
growth more than democracy in the short run. There may be states
that have good reason to distrust popular self-government. There
may be states where the citizens so distrust any politicians who might
come to power, whether democratically elected or not, that they
would prefer international governance to self-government. There may
be states where people feel, perhaps because of the state's small size,
that their nation's affairs are so dependent on international affairs
that genuine national self-government is not really a possibility for
them any more, in any event. If such states opt for international gov-
ernance, nothing I have said dictates that they have made the wrong
choice. All I have said is that the choice should be understood for
what it is.
This point is very important because a great deal of international
law today, as applied in a great number of countries, may be explained
by one or another of the factors just listed. The states of continental
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Europe may be right to maintain an antidemocratic international law
system as a check against fascist movements. The peoples of some
developing countries may be so brutally mistreated by their own gov-
ernments that they stand in desperate need of international govern-
ance. The United States has no reason to oppose international law in
such cases. On the contrary, it should be prepared in appropriate
cases to throw its weight behind international law for such states. Yes,
this will create precisely the seemingly hypocritical spectacle of the
United States championing international law abroad, even as we resist
it in our own case. But as we have seen, this is not quite hypocrisy. It
is rather a matter of respect for the fact that other peoples do not have
our luxuries and that they may have reason to prefer international
governance, even if we do not.
Moreover, democracies too are capable of atrocity. The Serbs'
genocidal campaigns of the 1990s were brought about when Serbian
democracy swept Slobodan Milosevic to power in a landslide. We
should not be afraid to use international law against such regimes, but
neither should we suppose that it was the violation of international
law that makes these atrocities atrocious or actionable. Serbian ethnic
cleansing did not demand intervention because it violated jus cogens
or the international conventions Yugoslavia had signed. The signifi-
cance of my point is this: It means we should not necessarily regard
ourselves as bound by international law when slaughters of this mag-
nitude unfold. The lesson of Kosovo in 1999 is, sadly, that U.S. uni-
lateralism, rather than international law, may sometimes be the only
force ready to stand against ethnic slaughter, even in Europe's own
backyard.
B. The Difference Between Buying a Car and
Marrying Your Car Dealer
The United States should strive to forge international coalitions
and to work together with the "international community" wherever
possible. It will be called a clich6, but America always should show a
decent respect for the opinions of mankind. The crucial transition to
beware is the moment when international cooperation shifts to inter-
national governance. If the United States means to remain self-gov-
erning, then international treaties-just as Washington said-always
will be problematic, because they threaten to make our law answer-
able to international governance, rather than self-government.
But not all international treaties are equally in tension with self-
government. As an analogy, think of an individual entering into a
contract. If you enter a contract with a car dealer, agreeing to make
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certain installment payments in the future in exchange for getting a
car today, you probably have not in any significant way compromised
your basic ability to govern yourself. On the contrary, you have used
a legal apparatus to help you get what you want.
If, however, you married your car dealer, that would be a very
different kind of contract. Now you have joined yourself in a special
kind of union with your car dealer, and your attitude to your own self-
governance will presumably change dramatically. You may now be
committed, morally or legally or psychologically, to taking into
account your car dealer's opinions or welfare whenever you make
important decisions. At the very least, you and your car dealer will
have joint control over many of your assets.
If, finally, you not only married your car dealer, but then agreed
to the jurisdiction of a special "international family court" with exclu-
sive jurisdiction over "all marital and family disputes," you would
have radically altered your ability to govern yourself. Yes, it was you
who agreed to all this; you may have taken every step voluntarily. But
that doesn't change the fact that you have radically altered your
ability to govern yourself going forward. A person can sell himself
into slavery voluntarily, but he will still be a slave thereafter.
The European Union is an instance of an international "mar-
riage" of this sort. Through the E.U., various states merge themselves
in a special way with one another, pledging to take each other's opin-
ions and interests into account in their most important decisions, and
vowing to submit themselves to supranational governance bodies to
manage their affairs. This is why the E.U. suffers from a "democracy
deficit," despite the fact that the member states voluntarily consented
to all the treaties creating it.
The rest of the world wants the United States to tie knots that
would bind us to other nations in similar fashion. It is easy to see why
that would be in their interests. It is harder to see why it would be
entirely in ours, especially if our interests are understood to include,
indispensably, an interest in being our own governors. The critical
feature of international treaties, from this point of view, is the creation
of supranational bodies charged with implementing or enforcing them.
For this reason, the United States was right to stay out of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, but, as I will say more about in a moment,
wrong to have submitted itself as cavalierly as it has to international
economic-governance bodies.
The United States should be much more willing to sign a treaty
when the treaty is more like an ordinary contract in the sense just
described-i.e., when the agreement is narrow in scope, and when it
creates no third-party, supranational entities empowered to supervise
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U.S. policy or to make, interpret or apply U.S. law. Such treaties can
be advantageous for many reasons, for example, where collective
action problems require collective pre-commitment mechanisms to
reach results many states seek, but none can attain without the others'
cooperation. Numerous problems in today's "globalized" environ-
ment may take the form of prisoner's dilemma, and limited treaties
covering these problems are perfectly acceptable. There are many
such treaties already in existence; these should be the models for the
kind of international law that the United States is prepared to accept.
On the other hand, we ought to have much greater reservations
about American participation in the international economic regimes
that we currently promote all over the world. First of all, we should
not be in the business of sabotaging democracy in the developing
world. Needless to say, the IMF, World Bank and WTO do not force
countries to accept their "structural adjustment" policies, but when
third-world elites, often corrupt, accept billions of international dol-
lars, incurring massive debt on behalf of their countries and agreeing
to IMF- or World Bank-dictated social and economic policy for years
to come, democracy in those countries suffers a very serious blow.
1 36
If such "structural adjustment" regimes really brought prosperity to
these countries, we could at least tell ourselves that we were acting in
their manifest best interests. The reality is otherwise. Developing
countries surrender their self-government into the capable hands of
the world economic order, and they often find themselves no better
off-and sometimes in utter ruin-years later.137 If the United States
136 See Howse, supra note 126, at 104 ("[E]ven before the Asian crisis, the Washington
consensus became visible as merely an ideology, imposed on developing countries by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and bitterly contested in political struggle every-
where."); Steven A. Ramirez, Market Fundamentalism's New Fiasco: Globalization as
Exhibit B in the Case for a New Law and Economics, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 831, 846-47
(2003) (reviewing JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002))
("Stiglitz has presented a compelling economic argument that lawyers must think about
how to create a global legal structure to support a more open and transparent financial
architecture.").
137 See PAUL MOSLEY ET AL., AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY-
BASED LENDING, ANALYSIS AND POLICY PROPOSALS 193-94 (1991) (concluding that
developing countries under structural adjustment regimes did worse economically than
comparable countries not under such regimes); Howse, supra note 126, at 104 (arguing that
IMF policies have not produced even "narrow success" on their own terms, and observing
that these policies are now challenged by "mainstream economists"); Jason Morgan-Foster,
Note, The Relationship of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs to Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights: The Argentine Case Revisited, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 577, 590 (2003) ("[I]n
1998, Argentina was the IMF's poster child. Two years later, Argentina was the scene of
the largest sovereign default in human history."). For a general discussion of IMF struc-
tural-adjustment policies, see ERIK DENTERS, LAW AND POLICY OF IMF CONDITIONALITY
(1996).
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is genuinely interested in seeing a world of self-governing states, we
should be a force for democracy in the developing world, not a force
against it.
But our own self-government is also at stake. The multilateral
economic institutions to which we belong have many of the "marital"
characteristics described a moment ago. Americans should be very
concerned to learn that congressional efforts to stop the outsourcing
of American jobs, or to pass environmental-protection or worker-
safety statutes, could well run into serious obstacles in the multilateral
trade organizations and international free trade tribunals that we have
erected. Under NAFTA and the WTO, an international tribunal can
rule American environmental, worker or consumer protection mea-
sures illegal. 138 So far as the threat to self-government is concerned,
there is no difference between an international free trade tribunal and
an international human rights tribunal.
To be sure, U.S. unilateralism on trade could lead to destructive,
escalating rounds of protectionism, but not all laws called "protec-
tionist" are equally bad. As Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph
Stiglitz has pointed out, "[H]idden in NAFTA was a new set of
rights-for business-that potentially weakened democracy
throughout North America. 1 39 NAFTA allows businesses to sue in
an international tribunal for "damages" caused to them by U.S. land-
use regulations deemed (by the tribunal) to "expropriate" their invest-
ments-essentially a protection against "regulatory takings" not
afforded by the U.S. Constitution, which could, depending on how the
free trade tribunals rule, significantly obstruct U.S. policy-making, and
which could, moreover, be triggered by laws perfectly defensible on
economic and other grounds. 140 In any event, I am not arguing for
138 See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 675,
713-16 (2003) (discussing ability of WTO panels to strike down American environmental-
protection regulations); Dana Krueger, Note, The Combat Zone: Mondev International,
Ltd. v. United States and the Backlash Against NAFTA Chapter 11, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 399,
401-02, 417, 425 (2003) (describing procedure under little-publicized Chapter 11 of
NAFTA allowing international tribunal to rule illegal American laws and regulations, to
overturn conclusions reached by American judiciary, and to order compensation for "tak-
ings" that would not be recognized as compensable under U.S. constitutional law).
139 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Editorial, The Broken Promise of NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2004, at A23.
140 See id.; Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the
Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L. 851, 852-71 (2003) (describing NAFTA proce-
dure and cases involving "expropriation" claims). According to Frank Loy, a former
Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs in the Clinton administration and former
chairman of the Environmental Defense Fund, the NAFTA expropriation cases raise the
question of whether NAFTA
has unacceptably compromised our nations' right to legislate in a way so as to
protect the environment and the health of their citizens .... Regulating the
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protectionism. The point is simply that U.S. economic policies should
be governed by America's democratic legislative processes, not by
international courts.
CONCLUSION: THE DANGER OF DOUBLE UNILATERALISM
Because of the 2003 war in Iraq, U.S. unilateralism is now associ-
ated in the minds of many with U.S. war-making and occupation. I
want, therefore, to reemphasize the point: I have made no arguments
here for or against the war in Iraq, and I certainly have made no case
for U.S. militarism. The unilateralism I have defended derives from
the aspirations of democracy; it would violate its own principles if it
became an engine of empire. It would not justify-on the contrary, it
would emphatically condemn-a new, self-appointed American mis-
sion to civilize by force, to colonize, to Americanize the world.
But the great and unsettling fact of twenty-first century global
governance is that America seems doomed to become something like
a world police force. With the development of small, uncontainable
technologies of mass destruction, and with the inability of the U.N. to
do the job, the United States will be in the business of using force
abroad against real or feared criminal and terrorist activity to a far
greater extent than ever before. As this process unfolds, American
presidents will face a strong and dangerous temptation.
For reasons of political advantage or for reasons more genuinely
high-minded American presidents may be tempted to use the role of
world's law enforcer as a justification for, or vehicle of, a new Amer-
ican militarism, in which the United States is constantly making or
preparing for war. This result would spell the end of the American
democratic ideal-as well as, most likely, the end of American peace
and prosperity. Democracies can make war when they have to, but
they cannot become military states without surrendering the spirit of
freedom that makes democracy worthwhile.
If, therefore, the United States is to be unilateralist abroad, it is
imperative that in our own domestic politics we retain and reinvigo-
rate the traditional constitutional mechanisms that serve to check
presidential overreaching. Since September 11, 2001, the White
House has flirted with a dangerous double unilateralism, joining the
environment requires a delicate balancing of important public interests, and
many believe that the balance has been tilted by these cases in such a way so
that many environmental laws and regulations are threatened.... I am talking
about whether these NAFTA-protected investments curtail the ability of
nations to protect their citizenry.
Frank E. Loy, On a Collision Course? Two Potential Environmental Conflicts Between the
U.S. and Canada, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 11, 18-19 (2002).
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executive's willingness to act without international consent abroad to
an effort to bypass Congress and the judiciary at home. In December
2001, the President on his own motion announced U.S. withdrawal
from an important missile treaty with Russia.141 The President's ini-
tial insistence that he needed no approval from Congress in order to
make war on Iraq142 was another vivid example of this domestic uni-
lateralism. Another was the creation of a U.S. executive enclave in
Cuba, governed by U.S. military forces yet assertedly outside of U.S.
judicial jurisdiction. 143 And another is the President's assertion of a
power to deem any individual, including an American citizen arrested
on American soil, an "enemy combatant" and on that basis to
imprison him indefinitely with no judicial review.
144
If Americans are prepared to support unilateralism abroad, they
have a special, heightened responsibility to resist presidential unilater-
alism at home. With the White House prepared to project America's
military force outside our territory in defiance of the U.N. Security
Council, Congress has an obligation to exercise its constitutional role
as a check on presidential war-making. At the same time, the judi-
ciary has an obligation to extend, everywhere U.S. force exerts itself,
the protections and constraints on the executive imposed by U.S. con-
stitutional or statutory law.
Yet the indications on this front are not hopeful. The U.S. Con-
gress does not seem to function as a check on presidential global
ambition. The judiciary has restricted, rather than extended, the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. legal protections, 145 and today is in
danger of capitulating in the face of gross executive abuses. The
American people themselves do not seem to expect or demand
otherwise.
These are serious failures. A lockstep Congress and judiciary
would fail to discharge responsibilities essential to U.S. world power.
It is not clear today that the American system of checks and balances
141 See supra note 16.
142 See Mike Allen & Julie Eilperin, Bush Aides Say Iraq War Needs No Hill Vote,
WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2002, at Al.
143 Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56 (D.D.C. 2002), rev'd, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004) ("It
is the government's position that the scope of those rights [possessed by detainees at Guan-
tanamo] are for the military and political branches to determine .... "); id. at 68-70
(explaining the government's position that Guantanamo Bay is "not part of the sovereign
territory of the United States").
144 See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), dismissed by Rum-
sfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
145 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992) (holding that
forcible abduction of defendant, Mexican citizen, from Mexico by U.S. agents did not bar
criminal prosecution); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269-70 (1990)
(rejecting extraterritorial application of Fourth and Fifth Amendments to non-citizens).
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can or will provide the requisite counter-weights to presidential
power. If we cannot restrain ourselves, we will leave the world
nowhere to appeal-but heaven.
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